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INTRODUCTION

Beginning in August 2016, a series of class action lawsuits
were filed on behalf of participants and beneficiaries of 403(b)
employee retirement plans sponsored by major American colleges
and universities. These plans are regulated by the 1974 Employee
Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), which sets minimum
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standards to protect the participants and beneficiaries of
voluntarily established retirement and health plans. The
allegations in the several lawsuits have centered primarily around
breaches of fiduciary duties by those charged with administering
the plan.
These cases are all class action lawsuits brought on behalf of
the participants and beneficiaries of the plans in question.
Generally, the class sizes are between 15,000 and 25,000, and the
plaintiffs have not had difficulty getting their classes certified by
the courts.
The defendants are 403(b) plan fiduciaries at prominent
colleges and universities with large pools of assets held in ERISA
covered plans. Each plan ranges in aggregate value from $1.25
billion to $4.7 billion.1 The fiduciaries charged with breach of duty
are those explicitly designated as such in plan documents, as well
as functional fiduciaries, i.e., those whose ERISA duties arise
because they (1) exercise discretionary authority/control over
management of a plan, (2) exercise authority/control over
management/disposition of plan's assets, (3) render investment
advice for a fee (or has authority to do so), or (4) have any
discretionary authority/responsibility in the of administration of
plan. 2 Most defendants are functional fiduciaries, as plan creation
documents usually only explicitly name one person or
organizational role.
Apart from the case against MIT, each plan sponsor
maintained between
two and five recordkeepers.
Some
recordkeepers in this industry provide only recordkeeping and
administrative services, while others provide both recordkeeping
services and investment products. This latter type is the kind
employed by the defendant institutions subject to these suits. The
primary companies whose services/products are at issue in these
cases are TIAA-CREF, Vanguard, and Fidelity. Having multiple

1 Observers have noted (somewhat cynically) that the first batch of suits may have
been chosen for the notoriety and deep pockets of the defendants rather than because
their actions were especially egregious. See Rick Seltzer, Retirement Plan Roulette,
INSIDE HIGHER ED (Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/08/18/re
tirement-plan-lawsuits-could-be-just-beginning [https://perma.cc/5RV9-ATSY].
2 See Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C.A § 1002(21)(A) (West,
Westlaw through PL 117-11 (excluding PL 116-283)).
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recordkeepers raises the costs associated with administering the
plans and has been alleged by plaintiffs to be de-facto imprudent. 3
The MIT case is unique among these suits in that Fidelity
was the sole recordkeeper and provider of investment options. In
this case, the plaintiffs have also brought "prohibited transaction"
claims based on the theory that Fidelity and MIT were both
"parties in interest." Plaintiffs assert that the philanthropic
generosity showed to MIT by Fidelity, coupled with the presence
on the MIT board of multiple Fidelity CEOs, created conflicts of
interest and fell under the umbrella of prohibited transactions
which create fiduciary conflicts, and which ERISA Section 406
was specifically designed to protect against. 4
The fiduciary breaches most cited are the "duty of prudence"
and "duty of loyalty," as well as allegations of various prohibited
transactions. In almost every instance, the only claims which have
survived 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss have been those relating to
prudence.

A. Breach of Duty of Loyalty Claims
Claims of breach of duty of loyalty were made in tandem with
the breach of duty of prudence claims. This appears to have been
part of a "pleading in the alternative" strategy, or at least the
testing of two theories, not knowing which one would be accepted
by the court. Several courts 5 ultimately determined that if there
was indeed a violation of ERISA, it was the result of the
3 Amended Complaint at 46, Cates v. Trs. of Columbia Univ., No. 1:16-cv-06524KBF (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2016), ECF No. 52 (asserting that "[t]he majority of plans use a
single recordkeeper because a multi-recordkeeper platform is inefficient") (internal
quotations omitted).
4 Complaint-Class Action at 9, Tracey v. Mass. Inst. Tech., No. 1:16-cv-11620NMG, (D. Mass. Aug. 9, 2016). The complaint against MIT alleges:
[long] after [Fidelity] was selected . . . as the Plan's recordkeeper, Fidelity ...
donated hundreds of thousands of dollars to MIT .. . for example, the Edward
C. Johnson Fund contributed $100,000 to MIT for 'Conferences' .. . $220,000
for 'Conservation-Arts & Sciences' . . . $25,000 for 'Program Support.'
Id.

5 See, e.g., Tracey v. Mass. Inst. Tech., No. 1:16-cv-11620-NMG, 2017 WL 4453541,
at *18 (D. Mass. Aug. 31, 2017), adopted in part and rejected in part 2017 WL 4478239
(Oct. 4, 2017); Vellali v. Yale Univ., 308 F. Supp. 3d 673, 688 (D. Conn. 2018) (". . . a
theory of breach based on incidental benefit, without more, cannot support a breach of
loyalty claim.").
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defendants' negligence and poor decision making, and not that the
defendants had placed their own or a third party's interests ahead
of the participants and beneficiaries. Most courts saw the loyalty
claims as simply recasting of the prudence claims and dismissed
them as without merit. 6 As the cases have proceeded, most of the
amended complaints dropped the loyalty claims and instead
alleged a broader breach of fiduciary duty, focused on prudence. 7

B. ProhibitedTransaction Claims
The prohibited transactions claims were frequently dismissed
as well. Those claims primarily focused on the assertion that fees
paid to plan recordkeepers constituted plan assets which are
prohibited from being transferred to a party in interest. 8 The
courts have largely been unpersuaded by this argument and
dismissed those claims, holding that the payment of these fees
does not constitute the transferring of plan assets, and noting that
6 See, e.g., Cassell v. Vanderbilt Univ., 285 F. Supp. 3d 1056, 1062 (M.D. Tenn.
2018) ("Plaintiffs' loyalty claims are characterizations that piggyback off their prudence
claims. The facts alleged in the Amended Complaint assert that Defendants failed to
manage and make decisions for the Plan in a prudent manner, not that Defendants
engaged in self-dealing or acted for the purpose of benefitting a third party ... ").
7 See, e.g., Amended Complaint, supranote 3, at 11 (dropping loyalty claims which
were made in initial complaint). An interesting note is that this spate of cases may
have been spurred by the new fiduciary rules proposed by the DOL under the Obama

administration in April 2016. See GARY SHORTER & JOHN J. TOPOLESKI, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., DEPARTMENT OF LABOR'S 2016 FIDUCIARY RULE: BACKGROUND AND

ISSUES 7-8 (July 3, 2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44884.pdf [https://perma.cc/78P3
-62JS]. While the implementation of those rules was first delayed by the Trump
administration and subsequently vacated by the Fifth Circuit in March 2018 before
ever going into effect, they brought the issue of fiduciary duty regarding retirement
planning into the spotlight, especially the difference between "suitability" and
"fiduciary" standards:
Under the prior regulation, securities brokers and dealers who provided
services to retirement plans and who were not fiduciaries were not required
to act in the sole interests of plan participants. Rather, their
recommendations had to meet a suitability standard, which requires that
recommendations be suitable for the plan participant, given factors such as
an individual's income, risk tolerance, and investment objectives. The
suitability standard is a lower standard than a fiduciary standard. Under
DOL's 2016 regulation, brokers and dealers are generally considered to be
fiduciaries when they provide recommendations to participants in retirement
plans.

Id. at ii. See also infra note 201.
8

See generally 29 U.S.C.A

§§

1106-08 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 116-259).
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C. Breach of Duty of Prudence Claims
The surviving allegations have then been related to whether
the fiduciaries breached their duty of prudence. This duty is
measured objectively, and courts have noted that "a pure heart
and an empty head are not enough." 10 The measure of prudence
looks at process as well as substance, requiring that a fiduciary
must obtain the relevant information necessary to make a prudent
decision, and must then use that information to make prudent
decisions in service of the best interests of the plan participants
and beneficiaries.11 While some courts dismissed those claims
prior to discovery, most found that at least certain aspects of these
claims were sufficiently pled to turn on issues of fact.
Plaintiffs' strategy shifted slightly over time as theories were
tested, but the most frequently asserted allegations of imprudent
actions/omissions taken by defendants fall into several, sometimes
overlapping categories:
1. Imprudent maintenance of multiple recordkeepers.
2. Imprudent selection of investment options.
a.
Too many options
b.
Retail class shares
c.
Poorly performing products
3. Imprudently allowing plan recordkeepers to charge
unreasonably excessive fees.
4. Failure to properly monitor co-fiduciaries.

9 See, e.g., Clark v. Duke Univ., 1:16-CV-1044, 2017 WL 4477002, at *2 (M.D.N.C.
May 11, 2017) ("To the extent the plaintiffs are alleging that it was a prohibited
transaction to invest in mutual funds because the entities providing the mutual funds
are parties-in-interest by virtue of making mutual funds available for investment, the
statute precludes that argument.").
10 Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1467 (5th Cir. 1983).
ii See Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 595 (8th Cir. 2009) ("In
evaluating whether a fiduciary has acted prudently, we therefore focus on the process
by which it makes its decisions rather than the results of those decisions.")
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EARLY CASES

The first round of cases were filed from dates spanning from
August 9, 2016 to August 17, 2016 by the law firm Schlichter,
Bogard & Denton LLP (SBD), against MIT, NYU, Yale, Duke,
Penn, Vanderbilt, Emory, Johns Hopkins, Columbia, Cornell,
Northwestern, and USC.12 These were derogatorily described by
some defendants as "cut-and-paste" lawsuits, and indeed the
initial and amended complaints were all very similar from case to
case. 1 3
The plaintiffs' litigation strategies center around the notion
that these employers violated the spirit and letter of ERISA by
essentially turning over decisions about their 403(b) plans to the
companies which served dual roles as plan recordkeepers and
investment product providers. Once arrangements were in place,
SBD alleged that the educational institutions all but walked away

and let TIAA-CREF,

Vanguard,

Fidelity,

and a few other

companies manage the plans with little or no oversight, especially
regarding fees and other costs, and the selection of myriad
investments available to plan participants. 14
12 See Complaint-Class Action at 1, 58, Munro v. Univ. of S. Cal., No. 2:16-cv06191 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2016), ECF No. 1; Class Action Complaint at 1, 54, Vellali v.
Yale Univ., 3:16-cv-01345 (D. Conn. Aug. 9, 2016), ECF No. 1; Complaint-Class Action
at 1, 81, Henderson v. Emory Univ., No. 1:16-cv-02920-MHC (N.D. Ga. Aug 11, 2016),
ECF No. 1; Complaint-Class Action at 1, 63, Divane v. Northwestern Univ., No. 1:16cv-08157 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 17, 2016), ECF No. 1; Complaint-Class Action, supra note 4,
at 1, 86; Complaint-Class Action at 2, 79, Kelly v. Johns Hopkins Univ., No. 1:16-cv02835-GLR (D. Md. Aug. 11, 2016), ECF No. 1; Complaint-Class Action at 1, 81, Clark
v. Duke Univ., No. 1:16-cv-01044 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 10, 2016), ECF No. 1; ComplaintClass Action at 1, 56, Cunningham v. Cornell Univ., No. 1:16-cv-06525 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
17, 2016), ECF No. 1; Complaint-Class Action at 1, 54, Cates v. Trs. of Columbia
Univ., No. 1:16-cv-06524-KBF (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2016), ECF No. 1; Complaint-Class
Action at 1, 57, Sacerdote v. N.Y. Univ., No. 1:16-cv-06284-KBF (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9,
2016), ECF No. 1; Complaint-Class Action at 1, Sweda v. Univ. of Pa.., No. 2:16-cv04329-GEKP (E.D. Pa. Aug. 10, 2016), ECF No. 1; Complaint-Class Action at 1, 75,
Cassell v. Vanderbilt Univ., No. 3:16-cv-02086 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 10, 2016), ECF No. 1.
13 Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs'
Consolidated Amended Complaint at 1, Cates v. Trs. of Columbia Univ., No. 1:16-cv06524-KBF, 2017 WL 3724296 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2017) (consolidated with Doe v.
Columbia Univ., No. 1:16-cv-06488 (S.D.N.Y. filed Aug 16, 2017)).
14 See, e.g., Amended Complaint at 98, Clark v. Duke Univ., No. 1:16-cv-01044CCE-LPA, (M.D.N.C. Nov. 21, 2016), ECF No. 24 ("Defendants' failure to conduct
appropriate due diligence in selecting and monitoring the Plan's investments resulted
in options being retained in the Plan despite years of historical underperformance
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A. Defendants MaintainedMultiple Recordkeepers
In all cases (except for MIT),15 which had its own unique
issues) the employers engaged at least two recordkeepers, one of
them always TIAA-CREF. The reason, in part, was that once
participants were invested in certain TIAA-CREF products, there
was no easy way to drop TIAA-CREF recordkeeping, as there were
(by design) ostensibly no other recordkeepers capable of managing
these products, which participants had already purchased. 16 This
coupled with the fact that the contracts the universities concluded
with TIAA-CREF required them to offer these immovable
products, all but guaranteed TIAA-CREF a customer for life in the
plan. 17 Plaintiffs allege that entering such an agreement in the
first place was imprudent on the part of plan fiduciaries. We
discuss this infra.
Plaintiffs' principle argument however, is that maintaining
multiple recordkeepers increases fees due to the breakup of the
considerable aggregate of assets into smaller pools which cannot
command the same discounts. 18 The defendants counter that as
certain popular products like the CREF Stock Account and the
TIAA Real Estate Account (a unique kind of REIT) were only
available through TIAA-CREF, they were offering the products
that the plan participants wanted, while the addition of Vanguard
or Fidelity served the participants' desire for a broad range of
mutual fund products in various investment styles and industry
sectors.
Two important events changed the landscape on this and
other issues. First, in 2007, the United States Department of the
Treasury issued revised guidelines on management of 403(b) plans
which brought them into closer alignment with 401(k) plan

compared to superior lower-cost alternatives, [which caused] massive losses to the Plan
compared to what those assets would have earned if invested in prudent
alternatives.").
15 See Complaint-Class Action, supra note 4, at 8-9, 11.
16 See Corrected Amended Complaint at 38-39, Cunningham v. Cornell Univ., No.
1:16-cv-06525-PKC-JLC, (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2017), ECF No. 81.
17 Id. at 38, 96.
18 Id. at 63.
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management; these new rules went into effect in 2009.19 Many
organizations who sponsored these plans (but not all) made
changes to better reflect these guidelines. Second, in 2015, the
Obama administration introduced a new fiduciary rule, which
would apply to all retirement investment advisors as of June
2016.20 The announcement of these rules triggered an
industrywide cleanup effort to bring plans in line with these
policies, which is noted in many of the complaints, including some
plans consolidating down to fewer recordkeepers. 2 1 SBD argues
however, that despite these remedial actions, the plan sponsors
remained in breach of their fiduciary duty during the period
proceeding such changes, and in most cases, remained in breach.
Essentially, plaintiffs' argument is, "too little, too late."
In support of these claims, SBD points (in the amended
complaints) to four Universities (Pepperdine, Loyola Marymount,
Purdue, and Cal Tech) which changed their plans by consolidating
recordkeeping and reducing the number of investment options,
actions consistent with SBD's image of a prudent fiduciary. 22 The
defendants say these examples are cherry picked, and that a far
greater number of institutions maintained a plan structure
similar to those under attack.

B. Defendants Allowed the Plans to Offer a Selection of
Investment Products Which Harmed Plan Participants.
1.

Plaintiffs Claim There Were Far Too Many Investment

Options in the Plans, Many of Them Duplicative, Creating

19 See Revised Regulations Concerning Section 403(b) Tax-Sheltered Annuity
Contracts; Final Rule, 72 FR 41127, 41130 (July 26, 2007) (codified at 26 CFR 1, 26
CFR 31, 26 CFR 54, & 26 CFR 6020).
20 Barack Obama, Remarks at AARP Headquarters, (Feb. 23, 2015), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-201500119/pdf/DCPD-201500119.pdf [https
://perma.cc/WN6Y-VFUP].
21 See, e.g., Amended Complaint at 23-28, Sweda v. Univ. of Pa., No. 2:16-cv-04329GEKP (E.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2016), ECF No. 27 (noting that Pepperdine, Loyola
Marymount, Purdue and others made changes including consolidation of recordkeeping
services).
22 See, e.g., id. at 23-28. See also Amended Complaint at 39-43, Sacerdote v. N.Y.
Univ., No. 1:16-cv-06284-KBF (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2016), ECF No. 39.
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Decision Paralysis Amongst Participants, Which in Turn Leads
to Predictably Suboptimal Investment Choices 23
The plans in the first batch of suits included between 78 and
440 investment products from which participants could choose.
Plaintiffs' claim is that these numbers were imprudently high.
First, they cite psychological studies about "analysis paralysis"
which holds that when individuals are given too many options to
choose from, they cannot make an informed choice, or often any
choice at all. 24 This leads participants to be highly suggestible to
blindly accept recommendations chosen for them by the
recordkeepers/investment providers. 25 Second, these large pools of
investments often included duplicative funds. SBD argues that it
is patently imprudent to offer identical products following the
same investment profile. 26

2. Including "Retail Class Shares" was Inappropriate when
Cheaper "Institutional Class Shares" Were Available to These
403(b) Plans
SBD insists that it was imprudent for the plan sponsors to
include "retail class shares" in the plans, describing them as being
identical in every way to "institutional class" shares except for
significantly higher costs. 2 7
The defendants dispute this claim, saying that retail class
shares are more liquid and allow the participants to day-trade
with their retirement accounts. At the motion to dismiss stage,
courts have differed on this issue. Experts produced by both sides
continue to argue about the validity of including these products

23

See Amended Complaint, supra note 21, at 65 (citing MICHAEL LIERSCH, T. ROWE

PRICE RETIREMENT RESEARCH, CHOICE IN RETIREMENT PLANS: How PARTICIPANT
BEHAVIOR DIFFERS IN PLANS OFFERING ADVICE, MANAGED ACCOUNTS, AND TARGET-

DATE INVESTMENTS, at 2 (Apr. 2009) ("Offering too many choices to consumers can lead
to decision paralysis, preventing consumers from making decisions.")).
24 Id.
2s See id.
26 Id. at 73 ("Had Defendants combined hundreds of millions of dollars in Plan
assets from duplicative index funds into a single index fund, the Plan would have
obtained lower fees and generated higher investment returns, net of fees, and
participants would not have lost millions of dollars in retirement assets.").
27 See Second Amended Complaint at 32, Henderson v. Emory Univ., No. 1:16-cv02920-CAP (N.D. Ga. Dec. 20, 2017), ECF No. 108.
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side by side, as many of the plans have done (though some
products were only available in retail share form). The court in
Sacerdote v. New York University, for example (granting the
defendant's 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss such a claim), cited
decisions by the Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits dismissing
claims that fiduciaries breached their duties by including retail
class mutual funds among their investment options. 28

3. Plaintiffs Allege that Certain Products, Especially the
CREF Stock Account and TIAA Real Estate Account, were
Imprudent Investment Products that Should Either Never

Have Been Included or Should Have Been Removed for
Consistently Poor Performance
Regarding the CREF Stock Account, plaintiffs make a
broader argument about the prudence of actively managed index
funds in general. They cite numerous studies as well as Nobel
Prize winning economists 29 who have argued that such products
are an inherently bad investment choice, pointing out that
because actively managed funds can only beat the market at the
expense of other funds losing (zero-sum) any benefit of actively
managed accounts can only be attributed to manager skill, or luck.
The economists' statistical analysis has shown that manager skill
is a negligible factor in fund performance, and that once the costs
of actively managed funds are considered, the fees outstrip any
appreciable benefits attributable to manager skill. The
universities, predictably, point to the wide adoption and
popularity of actively managed funds, and argue that "prudence"
is measured objectively, that is, the plan sponsors were acting the
way the typical, reasonable, prudent plan sponsor would act. This

&

28 See Sacerdote v. N.Y. Univ., 1:16-cv-06284-RWS,
2017 WL 3701482, at *11
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2017). But see Cunningham v. Cornell Univ., No. 1:16-cv-06525PKC, 2017 WL 4358769, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2017) (disagreeing with Sacerdote
court's reading of precedent, and their ruling on this same issue).
29 See Amended Complaint, supra note 14, at 105 ("Properly measured, the average
actively managed dollar must underperform the average passively managed dollar, net
of costs.") (quoting William F. Sharpe, The Arithmetic of Active Management, 47 FIN.
ANALYSTS J. 7, 8 (1991)); See id. ("After costs ... in terms of net returns to investors,
active investment must be a negative sum game.") (quoting Eugene F. Fama
Kenneth R. French, Luck Versus Skill in the Cross-Section of Mutual Fund Returns, 65
J. FIN. 1915, 1915 (2010)).
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amounts to an "if everyone else was jumping off a cliff

."

argument.

Plaintiffs insist that a prudent fiduciary who closely
monitored the plans would have determined that, despite their
popularity in the market, the excessive fees and poor performance
of the CREF Stock Account and TIAA Real Estate Account should
have resulted in their removal, or, if removal was going to be
contractually impossible later despite these factors, should have
prevented these products from ever having been offered.
Defendants
however
have
vigorously
challenged
this
characterization of those products and noted that participants
were not required to purchase those products. These claims have
generally not survived motions to dismiss.3 0

C. Cost of Recordkeeping Services Was Inherently Imprudent
Each of the defendant universities paid for recordkeeping
services with a "revenue sharing" model under which the
investment management side of the companies would compensate
the recordkeeping side of the company with a percentage of the
fees collected on the investments. Defendants point out that courts
have upheld the legitimacy of revenue sharing schemes. 31 They
note that flat-fee schemes might be beneficial for participants with
larger balances, but for employees with small investment balances
it would likely raise costs. Plaintiffs argue vehemently that a
prudent fiduciary would either have entered a "flat rate" fee
arrangement at a cost of $30-$35 per plan participant, or, if using
a revenue sharing scheme, would have capped the fees to ensure
they remained reasonable. In their motions to dismiss, defendants
argue that the $30-$35 flat fee range is pulled from thin air, and
that the plaintiff class has not shown evidence to back up that

30 See, e.g., Cunningham v. Cornell Univ., No. 1:16-cv-06525-PKC, 2017 WL
4358769, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2017) ("... the Plans' contractual agreement with
TIAA-CREF requiring it to place certain investment options in the Plans and use
TIAA-CREF's recordkeeping services does not, on its own, demonstrate imprudence.").
31 See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Failure
to State a Claim at 19, Sweda v. Univ. of Pa., No. 2:16-cv-04329-GEKP, 2017 WL
4179752 (E.D. Pa. May 2, 2019), ECF No. 25-2 ('revenue sharing' - is common and
'violates no statute or regulation."') (quoting Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 585
(7th Cir. 2009)).
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benchmark. 32 (The fees actually paid under the revenue sharing
agreements were significantly higher than the "reasonable" range
SBD cites.) 33
The thrust of SBD's theory is that the economy of scale for
recordkeeping services makes plans with more participants less
expensive per participant the larger they grow. Conversely, if
recordkeepers are paid through uncapped revenue sharing
agreements with compensation based on a percentage of the
assets under management, the profits to the recordkeeper
continue to rise without any corresponding increase in
recordkeeping responsibilities.

D. Defendants Failed to Monitor Their Co-Fiduciaries
While some of the allegations of imprudence relate to specific
actions, e.g., locking in TIAA-CREF recordkeeping by including
annuities and other products that could not be moved to another
recordkeeper, most of the claims are based on the theory that plan
fiduciaries were asleep at the wheel and failed to effectively
monitor the plans to ensure they adequately reflected the best
interests of the participants. Defendants argue that the various
committees charged with monitoring the plans discharged their
duties faithfully, and that the plaintiffs simply disagree with the
choices they made. Most courts have dismissed this claim either
as barred by the statute of limitations, or because the plaintiffs
failed to present sufficient facts to back up the claim. Additionally,
the judge in the Cornell litigation noted that the United States
Supreme Court has "suggested that fiduciaries normally have a
continuing duty 'of some kind' to 'monitor investments and remove

32 See, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs' Complaint at 20, Cassell v. Vanderbilt Univ., No. 3:16-cv-02086 (M.D. Tenn.
Oct. 11, 2016), ECF No. 31 ("Without a benchmark against which to compare the Plan's
fees, Plaintiffs have provided no well-pled allegation from which the Court can
plausibly conclude that the recordkeeping fees were too high.").
3
See Amended Complaint, supra note 22, at 59 (paying $230-$270 per
participant); see also Amended Complaint at 65-66, Cassell v. Vanderbilt Univ., No.
3:16-cv-02086 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 12, 2016), ECF No. 38 (paying $100-$145 per
participant until negotiating flat fee of $32 per participant in 2015).
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imprudent ones,"' but that the Court had specifically refused to
define the scope of that duty. 34
To date, Plaintiffs have largely failed to present enough
evidence to show that the universities failed to monitor the plans.
Some plaintiffs have successfully argued, however, that their
claims are "based on flaws in [defendant's] process for selecting
and monitoring the Plans' fees and investments" and that
discovery is needed because "[defendant] has 'sole possession' of

that knowledge." 35
II. SETTLEMENTS, APPEALS, AND ROUND II
Eight cases have resulted in settlement agreements. MIT,
Duke, Vanderbilt, Emory, Johns Hopkins, University of Chicago,
Princeton, and Brown settled their cases for amounts ranging
from $3.5 to $18.1 million.3 6

34 Cunningham v. Cornell Univ., No. 1:16-cv-06525-PKC, 2017 WL 4358769, at *8
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2017) (citing Tibble v. Edison Int'l, 575 U.S. 523, 528-29(2015)).
35 See, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Cornell Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint [Doc. 71] at 25, Cunningham v. Cornell Univ.,
No. 1:16-cv-06525-PKC, 2017 WL 4358769 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2017), ECF No. 87.
Defendants' motion to dismiss monitoring claim was denied insofar as it related to
surviving underlying prudence claims.
36 Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Unopposed Motion for Preliminary
Approval of Class Settlement at 3, Tracey v. Mass. Inst. Tech., No. 1:16-cv-11620-NMG
(D. Mass. Oct. 28, 2019), ECF No. 291 (settled for $18.1 million and other nonpecuniary relief); Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class
Settlement at 2, Clark v. Duke Univ., No. 1:16-cv-01044-CCE-LPA (M.D.N.C. Jan. 16.
2019), ECF No. 149 (settled for $10.65 million and other non-pecuniary relief);
Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Settlement at 2,
Cassell v. Vanderbilt Univ., No. 3:16-cv-02086 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 22, 2019), ECF No. 145
(settled for $14.5 million and other non-pecuniary relief); Joint Motion for Preliminary
Approval of Class Settlement at 2, Henderson v. Emory Univ., No. 1:16-cv-02920-CAP
(N.D. Ga. May 29, 2020), ECF No. 218 (settled for $16.75 million and other nonpecuniary relief); Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action
Settlement at 2, Kelly v. Johns Hopkins Univ., No. 1:16-cv-02835-GLR (D. Md. Aug. 6,
2019), ECF No. 84 (settled for $14 million and other non-pecuniary relief); Plaintiffs'
Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion for Preliminary Approval of the
Proposed Settlement and Related Matters at 2, Daugherty v. Univ. of Chi., No. 1:17-cv03736 (N.D. Ill. May 22, 2018), ECF No. 58 (settled for $6.5 million and other nonpecuniary relief); see Final Approval Order and Final Judgment, Nicolas v. Trs. of
Princeton Univ., No. 3:17-cv-03695-DEA (D.N.J. Dec. 12, 2020), ECF No. 72
(settlement terms not disclosed); Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for an Order: Providing
Final Approval for Class Action Settlement and Approving the Plan of Allocation at 1,
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The NYU case proceeded to a bench trial where it was
dismissed, but that decision was appealed to the Second Circuit
where it is currently under review.
In the Penn case, all claims were dismissed on the 12(b)(6)
motion, and the case was appealed to the Third Circuit. The
appeals court reversed in part, directing the lower court to allow
the unreasonable and excessive fee prudence claims to proceed.
Defendants petitioned to have that decision stayed, and for their
case to be reheard by full Third Circuit. Defendants' argument for
rehearing was that the Third Circuit had ignored its own
precedent in Renfro r. Unisys Corporation,37 specifically in the
court's holding that having a wide range of investment options is
"highly relevant." 38 The Third Circuit noted however that Renfro
based its decision on Hecker r. Deere & Company,39 which had
held that having bad funds alongside good funds does not violate
fiduciary duties, so long as there are a sufficient number of good
choices. However, Hecker never addressed the issue of the
fiduciary duties related to the process for selection of those
investment options. 40 The petition for rehearing was denied, as
was a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court. The Penn case
is now in the district court, headed to trial on the claims
reinstated by the Third Circuit.
The Northwestern litigation 41 was dismissed in full on the
defendants 12(b)(6) motion. Plaintiffs appealed that decision to
the Seventh Circuit, which rejected their appeal and finalized
dismissal of the case. To date, this is the only one of these related
cases that has ended in complete legal defeat for a plaintiff class. 42
Yale 43 is proceeding toward trial with the claims that
survived defendants' 12(b)(6) motions, largely claims related to
Short v. Brown Univ., No. 1:17-cv-00318-WES-PAS (D.R.I. July 3, 2019), ECF No. 48
(settled for $3.5 million and other non-pecuniary relief).
" Renfro v. Unisys Corp., 671 F.3d 314, 320 (3d Cir. 2011).
38 Id. at 327.

39

Id.

Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 586 (7th Cir. 2009) ("[E]ven if, as plaintiffs
urge, there is a fiduciary duty on the part of a company offering a plan to furnish an
acceptable array of investment vehicles, no rational trier of fact could find, on the basis
of the facts alleged in this Complaint, that Deere failed to satisfy that duty.").
41 Divane v. Northwestern Univ., No. 1:16-cv-08157 (N.D. Ill. filed Aug. 17, 2016).
42 See generally id.
4 Vellali v. Yale Univ., 308 F. Supp. 3d 673, 684, 691 (D. Conn. 2018).
40
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excessive administrative fees and costs, and failure to monitor the
plans.
The Columbia 44 and Cornell 45 cases are also both headed to
trial after failures by both defendants to prevail on motions for
summary judgment. The Cornell case is running on fumes,
however, with all but a small sliver of the original claims
dismissed. Given the situation facing the courts due to COVID-19,
the Judge has strongly urged the parties to settle, noting that it
will likely be a long time before a trial can be held. The Cornell
case also happens to be the only in which the plaintiff class was
able to successfully demand a jury trial, which is a further
complication during the COVID-19 pandemic. The case against
Columbia University is also headed for trial, but the core fiduciary
breach claims remain intact in that suit.
The USC46 litigants await a ruling on the 12(b)(6) motion,
because one has not yet been filed by the defendants in response
to the amended complaint. The proceedings were delayed
significantly when USC attempted to get the court to force the
defendants into binding arbitration. 47 The district court refused,
and the Ninth Circuit upheld that decision on appeal. 48 USC then
further appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which declined to
grant certiorari. 49 Discovery has been bifurcated into two sections,
dealing first only with discovery related to class certification. The
class was certified in December of 2019, and the case proceeds
toward trial.

A. Round II New Lawyers, New Cases
It does not appear that any plan fee cases were filed between
August 18, 2016 and May 18, 2017, when Schneider, Wallace,

44 Cates v. Trs. of Columbia Univ., No. 1:16-cv-06524 (S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 17, 2016)
(consolidated with Doe v. Columbia Univ., No. 1:16-cv-06488 (S.D.N.Y. filed Aug 16,
2016)).
45 Cunningham v. Cornell Univ., No. 1:16-cv-06525 (S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 17, 2016).
46 Munro v. Univ. of S. Cal., No. 2:16-cv-06191 (C.D. Cal. filed Aug. 17, 2016).
47 See generally id.
48 Munro v. Univ. of S. Cal., 896 F.3d 1088, 1094 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139
S. Ct. 1239 (2019).
49 Univ. of S. Cal. v. Munro, 139 S. Ct. 1239 (2019), denying cert to 896 F.3d 1088
(9th Cir. 2018).
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Cottrell, Konecky, & Wotkyns LLP (SWC)50 filed their first case in
a series of similar cases, the first on behalf of a class representing
participants and beneficiaries of a 403(b) plan sponsored by the
University of Chicago.51
The University of Chicago's 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the
amended complaint was denied in its entirety. 52 The claims
focused solely on breach of the duty of prudence, specifically
related to excessive and unreasonable fees and expenses, and
failure to prudently monitor investment choices, specifically
regarding the CREF Stock Account and TIAA Real Estate
Account. Following this order, the parties entered mediation. 53
Claims against Brown University 54 followed. Filed in July of
2017, the court denied Brown's motion to dismiss the prudence
claims relating to excessive fees and bad investment offerings, and
the parties also entered mediation. On September 12, 2018, a
settlement was agreed in the University of Chicago case for
$6,500,000, making it one of the first of these cases to settle. 55
Then, on April 15, 2019, a preliminary settlement was reached for
$3,500,000.56 Both settlements require that the plan sponsors
reform their plans to bring down administrative costs and fees
and implement structural changes to plan monitoring.57
50 SWC is a national plaintiffs' litigation law firm focused primarily on "class
action, mass tort, and other complex commercial cases." See Our Firm, SCHNEIDER,
WALLACE, COTTRELL & KONECKY, https://www.schneiderwallace.com/our-firm/

[https://

perma.cc/AFJ6-U4JL] (last visited Mar. 6, 2021).
51 See Daugherty v. Univ. Chi., No. 1:17-cv-03736 (N.D. Ill. filed May 18, 2017).
52 Daugherty v. Univ. of Chi., No. 1:17-cv-03736, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6965, at
*1-2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 2018).
53 See Notification of Docket Entry, Daugherty v. Univ. of Chi., No. 1:17-cv-03736
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 31, 2018), ECF No. 54.
64 Short v. Brown Univ., No. 1:17-cv-00318-WES-PAS (D.R.I. filed July 6, 2017).
55 Notification of Docket Entry, Daugherty v. Univ. of Chi., No. 1:17-cv-03736 (N.D.
Ill. Sept. 12, 2018), ECF No.76.
56 See Order Preliminarily Approving Settlement at 2, Short v. Brown Univ., No.
1:17-cv-00318-WES-PAS (D.R.I. Apr. 15, 2019), ECF No. 47.
67 In each case the attorneys were awarded 30% of the settlement funds with the
remaining portion of the settlement funds to be distributed on a pro-rata basis to
qualified class members. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for
an Order: Finally Approving Class Action Settlement; Approving the Plan of
Allocation; Approving Case Contribution Awards to Plaintiffs; and Awarding
Attorneys' Fees and Costs at 22, Daugherty v. Univ. of Chi., No. 1:17-cv-03736 (N.D.
Ill. Aug. 15, 2018), ECF No. 67; Final Approval Order and Final Judgment at 5, Short
v. Brown Univ., No. 1:17-cv-00318-WES-PAS (D.R.I. Aug. 2, 2019), ECF No. 55.
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Washington University 58 was also a defendant. The
complaint was dismissed in its entirety and was appealed to the
Eighth Circuit which reversed in part and affirmed in part,
sending the case back to the District Court with the excessive fee
claims revived. 59
The litigation against Georgetown University6 0 seems to have
been bungled by plaintiffs counsel, as they missed a deadline to
file an amended complaint, and the court refused to allow them
permission to extend, then granted the defendants' motion to
dismiss on all counts. 6 1 The plaintiffs have appealed to the D.C.
Circuit where the case awaits review. Rochester University 62
plaintiffs withdrew their case before defendants filed their
response to the initial complaint.63
The Princeton 64 litigation was temporarily delayed pending a
ruling in the Penn case on whether the Third Circuit would
reverse the dismissal of all claims. The Third Circuit revitalized
two of claims from the complaint, allowing them to proceed, and
on that basis, litigation in the Princeton case recommenced,
entered mediation, and settled. 65
The tug-of-war that has gone on in the financial sector and in
Congress, 66 over the identity and scope of fiduciaries and their

58

Davis v. Wash. Univ. in St. Louis, No. 4:17-cv-01641 (E.D. Mo. filed Jun. 8,

2017).

59 See Judgment, Davis v. Wash. Univ. in St. Louis, No. 4:17-cv-01641-RLW (E.D.
Mo. Sept. 28, 2018), ECF No. 51; Notice of Appeal, Davis v. Wash. Univ. in St. Louis,
No. 4:17-cv-01641-RLW (E.D. Mo. Oct. 25, 2018), ECF No. 52.
60 Wilcox v. Georgetown Univ., No. 1:18-cv-00422-RMC (D.D.C. filed Feb. 23, 2018).
61 See Order at 1, Wilcox v. Georgetown Univ., No. 1:18-cv-00422-RMC (D.D.C.
Jan. 8, 2019), ECF. No. 36.
62 D'Amore v. Univ. of Rochester, No. 6:18-cv-06357 (W.D.N.Y. filed May 11, 2018).
63 See Emily Brill, Rochester Univ. Talks Workers Out of Litigating ERISA Suit,
LAw360 (Jan. 22, 2019, 8:20 PM) ("The university did not change anything about the
way it handles its retirement plan as a result of the negotiations . . . the attorney,
Nancy Ross of Mayer Brown LLP, . . . attributed the voluntary dismissal to the
workers' acknowledgement of 'substantial mistakes' in their complaint.").
64 Nicolas v. Trs. of Princeton Univ., No. 3:17-cv-03695-DEA (D.N.J. filed May 23,
2017).
65 Text Order, Nicolas v. Trs. of Princeton Univ., No. 3:17-cv-03695-DEA (D.N.J.
Dec. 10, 2020), ECF No. 69; Final Approval Order and Final Judgment, Nicolas v. Trs.
of Princeton Univ., No. 3:17-cv-03695-DEA (D.N.J. Dec. 22, 2020), ECF No. 72.
66 See Oversight Hearing on Mutual Funds: Hidden Fees, Misgovernance and Other
Practices that Harm Investors: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Fin. Mgmt., the
Budget, and Int'l Sec. of the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 108th Cong. 3 (2004)
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attendant responsibilities, is on full display in each of these cases.
While defendants have disputed whether certain investment
products and compensation schemes are as undesirable as
plaintiffs allege, it is clear that if all parties involved had been
subject to and adhered to a clearer fiduciary standard, the plans
would have looked quite different.
All defendant universities voluntarily created 403(b) plans as
a benefit for their employees, and in doing so were subject to the
rules laid out in ERISA. Each university had at least one named
fiduciary, but in most cases the number of functional fiduciaries
was much larger. Every person, committee, or board that had
discretionary control or authority over the plans was obligated to
act only in the best interests of plan participants and
beneficiaries. Plaintiffs argue that they failed to live up to that
obligation. 67 Defendants insist they met it.

B. Could the Whole Industry Be Imprudent?
While the standards of prudence are measured objectively, it
is at least theoretically possible for an entire industry to be acting
negligently or unreasonably. Under these circumstances,
evaluating prudence by looking to peer conduct would not result in
an accurate assessment of objective prudence. The plaintiffs'
principal argument hinges on the fact that there was widespread
failure of these higher educational institutions to put their plan
participants first, and a general acceptance of the products and
services offered by TIAA-CREF, Vanguard, Fidelity, and others
without the initial and continuing due diligence required by
ERISA. In hindsight, this costs plan participants significant sums
of money relative to alternative actions that plan fiduciaries could
have taken. The question then for the courts to answer is, "were
[hereinafter "FitzgeraldHearings"], https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-108shr
g92686/html/CHRG-108shrg92686.htm [https://perma.cc/7KUN-GLZ7] (Statement of
Sen. Peter Fitzgerald, Chairman, Subcomm. on Financial Management, The Budget,
and International Security) ("The mutual fund industry is indeed the world's largest
skimming operation... ").
67 See Corrected Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at 132 ("Defendants therefore
failed to discharge its duties with respect to the Plans solely in the interest of the
participants and beneficiaries and for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to
participants and their beneficiaries and defraying reasonable expenses of
administering the Plans. This was a breach of fiduciary duties.").
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plan fiduciaries legally required to make different choices than

they did?"
The only case so far that has examined all the facts at a
bench trial, Sacerdote v. New York University, concluded
defendants violated no duty, though that decision has been
appealed. 68
Eight cases have settled for amounts between $18.1 million
and $3.5 million, as well as guarantees that the plans would be
subject to stricter fiduciary supervision. 69
The remaining cases are in ongoing litigation. The cases
share many factual similarities, but there are some noteworthy
differences as well. Appeals are currently pending before the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second, Third, Fourth,
Seventh and Eighth circuits regarding the proper interpretation of
the fiduciary rules under ERISA. If the circuits split however, this
may be an issue ripe for certiorari by the Supreme Court, which
has so far declined to intervene when petitioned in these cases. 70
III. FOUR CASES WORTH A CLOSER LOOK: DUKE, U. PENN, NYU,
AND MIT
As of this writing, more than twenty-one class action lawsuits
have been filed by 403(b) plan participants and beneficiaries
against the private, not-for-profit universities which sponsored
those plans. 7 1 All allege plan sponsors violated their fiduciary
68 Docketing Notice, Sacerdote v. New York Univ., No.16-cv-6284 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
12, 2018) ECF No. 1.
69 See supra note 36.
7
See, e.g., Univ. of Pa. v. Sweda, 140 S. Ct. 2565 (2020) denying cert. to 923 F.3d
320 (3d Cir. 2019).
71 See Mulligan v. Long Island Univ., No. 1:18-cv-02885 (E.D.N.Y. filed May 15,
2018) (voluntarily dismissed by plaintiffs); D'Amore v. Univ. of Rochester, No. 6:18-cv06357 (W.D.N.Y. filed May 11, 2018) (voluntarily dismissed by plaintiffs); Stanley v.
George Washington Univ., No. 1:18-cv-00878 (D.D.C. filed Apr. 13, 2018), dismissed by
394. F. Supp. 3d 97 (D.D.C. 2019) (dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction);
Wilcox v. Georgetown Univ., No. 1:18-cv-00422 (D.D.C. filed Feb. 23, 2018); Short v.
Brown Univ., No. 1:17-cv-00318 (D.R.I. filed July 6, 2017); Davis v. Washington Univ.
in St. Louis, No. 4:17-cv-01641 (E.D. Mo. filed June 8, 2017); Nicolas v. Trs. of
Princeton Univ., No. 3:17-cv-03695 (D.N.J. filed May 23, 2017); Daugherty v. Univ. of
Chi., No. 1:17-cv-03736 (N.D. Ill. filed May 18, 2017); Cates v. Trs. of Columbia Univ.,
No. 1:16-cv-06524 (S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 17, 2016) (consolidated with Doe v. Columbia
Univ., No. 1:16-cv-06488 (S.D.N.Y. filed Aug 16, 2016)); Cunningham v. Cornell Univ.,
No. 1:16-cv-06525 (S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 17, 2016); Divane v. Northwestern Univ., No.
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responsibilities under ERISA. The several lawsuits have much in
common, and the sometimes-divergent treatment by the district
courts 72 and the courts of appeal17 3 indicates a lack of clarity in the
federal courts over the legal status of these claims. We selected
the following four cases (and present them in case study format)
for special focus as each presents unique issues as courts struggle
to determine the scope of fiduciary duty of prudence with respect
to 403(b) plans.

A. Clark v. Duke University
This federal class action lawsuit was filed August 10, 2016 in
the Middle District of North Carolina, located within the
jurisdiction of the Fourth Circuit. 7 4
The Duke Faculty and Staff Retirement Plan (the Plan)
offered over 400 investment products from four companies who
also served as recordkeepers for those investments. 75 "As of

1:16-cv-08157 (N.D. Ill. filed Aug. 17, 2016); Munro v. Univ. of S. Cal., No. 2:16-cv06191, (C.D. Cal. filed Aug. 17, 2016); Henderson v. Emory Univ., No. 1:16-cv-02920
(N.D. Ga. filed Aug. 11, 2016); Kelly v. Johns Hopkins Univ., No. 1:16-cv-02835 (D. Md.
filed Aug. 11, 2016); Cassell v. Vanderbilt Univ., No. 3:16-cv-02086 (M.D. Tenn. filed
Aug. 10, 2016); Clark v. Duke Univ., No. 1:16-cv-01044-CCE-LPA (M.D.N.C. filed Aug.
10, 2016); Sacerdote v. N.Y. Univ., No. 1:16-cv-06284 (S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 9, 2016);
Sweda v. Univ. of Pa., No. 2:16-cv-04329 (E.D. Pa. filed Aug. 9, 2016); Tracey v. Mass.
Inst. of Tech., No. 1:16-cv-11620 (D. Mass. filed Aug. 9, 2016); Vellali v. Yale Univ., No.
3:16-cv-01345 (D. Conn. filed Aug. 9, 2016).
72 Two cases filed by the same legal team with nearly identical relevant facts came
to different conclusions on whether the "prohibited transaction" claim related to
unreasonably high fees had been sufficiently pled. See Clark v. Duke Univ., No. 1:16cv-01044-CCE-LPA, 2017 WL 4477002, at *2 (M.D.N.C. May 11, 2017) (claim survived
motion to dismiss). But see Sacerdote v. N.Y. Univ., 1:16-cv-06284-KBF, 2017 WL
3701482, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2017) (claim dismissed saying "allegations that the
Plans paid too much for those services-do not, without more, state a claim.").
7 There has been disagreement about the application of the pleading standard,
specifically whether the Twombly standard applies to ERISA fiduciary breach claims.
Under Twombly, to survive a 12(b)(6) motion, "a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."'
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). See Sacerdote v. N. Y. Univ., No. 1:16-cv-06284-KBF, 2017 WL
3701482, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2017) (stating, "to the extent one or more allegations
plausibly enable the Court to infer that plaintiffs have stated a claim under a
particular count, the Court need not assess whether the remaining allegations in such
a count could independently support that claim").
7" Clark v. Duke Univ., No. 1:16-cv-01044-CCE-LPA (M.D.N.C. filed Aug. 10, 2016).
75 Amended Complaint, supra note 14, at 50.
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December 31, 2014, the Plan held $4.7 billion in net assets" in
37,939 accounts. 76 "TIAA-CREF funds accounted for $1.3 billion,
Vanguard . . . $887 million, Fidelity . .. $1.6 billion, and VALIC .
. $903 million." 77 When plan participants invest in mutual funds
or other retirement products, these companies charge a variety of
fees, typically measured in "basis points." One basis point is equal
to 1/100 of a percent of the purchase price, and low cost, passively
managed index funds might charge as little as one basis point,
while some actively managed funds with a similar profile may
charge fees as high as 150 basis points. 78 Additional fees may also
be charged for other services including those related to marketing
and distribution expenses. 7 9 On top of that, some companies
provided recordkeeping services which were paid through a
somewhat opaque system of "revenue sharing" agreements, by
which underlying funds charge a higher expense ratio, and then
pay a portion of that fee to the recordkeeper, often (including in
the Duke case study) the same parent company that provides the
fund.8 0
It is the fees, alleged to be excessive and unreasonable, that
precipitated these lawsuits. It is widely accepted that even a small
increase in fees and expenses over the life of a plan can have huge
consequences for an individual's retirement income. 81 By
sanctioning these excessive costs, plaintiffs allege Duke breached
its fiduciary duty, and caused them significant financial harm.
The complaint against Duke is typical of the other university
ERISA class action suits in some respects. Plaintiffs allege:
fiduciary breaches
of loyalty
to the plan,
imprudent
administration of the plan, and violations of the prohibited
transactions rules, and failure to sufficiently monitor the plan and
its fiduciaries. 82 In almost every suit the loyalty claims have been
dismissed for failure to state a claim. The Duke litigation is
typical in this respect. Loyalty is a fundamental principle of trust

76

77

Id. at 7.
Id. at 54.

78 See, e.g., Amended Complaint at 43, Tracey v. Mass. Inst. of Tech.., No. 1:16-cv11620-NMG, (D. Mass. Nov. 16, 2016), ECF No. 32.
79 Cf. Amended Complaint, supra note 14, at 140.
80 See id. at 21.

81 KATHRYN L. MOORE, UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW 235 (2015).
82

See generally Amended Complaint, supra note 14.
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law-the foundation upon which fiduciary duty is built. 83 In
instances of clear theft or malfeasance it would be clear when the
duty of loyalty has been breached. However, ERISA, unlike trust
law, allows conflicted fiduciaries; it is much more difficult to
determine when such a breach of loyalty has occurred. 84
Universities, for example, must balance their duty to act in the
interest of plan participants against the interests of the
university, interests which may not always be in tandem. Here,
plaintiffs could not prevail on their claim that Duke breached the

duty of loyalty.
Plaintiffs had more success with allegations that the actions
and omissions of Duke violated the duty of prudence by allowing
the service provider(s) to charge unreasonable and excessive fees
for their products and management:
Instead of using the Plan's bargaining power to reduce
expenses and exercising independent judgment to determine
what investments to include in the Plan, Defendants
squandered that leverage by allowing the Plan's conflicted
third party service providers . . . to dictate the Plan's
investment lineup, to link their recordkeeping services to the
placement of their investment products in the Plan, and to
collect unlimited asset-based compensation from their own
proprietary products. 85

They also allege that plan fiduciaries engaged in certain
transactions prohibited under ERISA:
. . even though TIAA's recordkeeping fees were unreasonable
for the services provided, Defendants caused the Plan to
engage in transactions that it knew or should have known
constituted an exchange of property between the Plan and
TIAA-CREF . . . a direct or indirect furnishing of services
between the Plan and TIAA-CREF . . . and a transfer of Plan
assets to TIAA-CREF . . . . These transactions occurred each
time the Plan paid fees to TIAA-CREF in connection with the
Plan's investments in the CREF Stock Account and other

83 MOORE, supra note 81, at 203.
84

Id.

85

Amended Complaint, supra note 14, at 3.
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proprietary options that paid revenue sharing to TIAA.86

While many courts have allowed the excessive
and
"unreasonable fee" claims to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss,
most have dismissed the "prohibited transactions" claims as
failing to state a claim, noting that ERISA lays out a broad suite
of exemptions to the general prohibition of transactions between
"parties at interest," including the transactions cited. 87 While the
district court did not elaborate on its reasoning for allowing the
prohibited transaction claim to proceed, it may well have been
because the "reasonableness" (or not) of the fees paid for various
investment products and recordkeeping services remained a
question of determinative material fact at the heart of the
complaint.
The Duke plaintiffs also alleged that plan fiduciaries failed to
adequately monitor co-fiduciaries. This claim survived a motion to
dismiss in several similar cases, but the court found the plaintiffs
had not alleged sufficient facts to support this claim, finding the
allegation "hypothetical and conclusory." 88
The parties entered mediation on November 29, 2018 and
reached a settlement agreement on January 16, 2019.89 The
settlement received its final approval from the court on June 24,
2019.90 The settlement includes $10,650,000 to be paid to the class
and stipulates changes that must be made to the administration of
the Plan. 91 These requirements included: disclosure to Plan
participants of existing investment options, their fees, and their
performance history; the hiring of an independent consultant to

86

Id. at 135.

The prohibited transactions in question, relating to the furnishing of
goods/services and the transfer of plan assets. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1106(a)(1)(C)-(D) (West,
Westlaw through PL 117-14). There are explicit exceptions to these prohibitions in 29
U.S.C.A. § 1108(b), but the Code specifies that to qualify for the exemption the party in
interest is not to receive more compensation "than is reasonable." Id.
88 See Clark v. Duke Univ., No. 1:16-cv-01044, 2017 WL 4477002, at *2 (M.D.N.C.
May 11, 2017).
89 Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Unopposed Motion for Final Approval of
Class Settlement at 3, Clark v. Duke Univ., No. 1:16-cv-01044, (M.D.N.C. June 4,
2019), ECF No. 163.
87

90
91

See id. at 10.
Id. at 3.
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review the plan and recommend appropriate requests for
proposals to ensure administrative and recordkeeping costs are
kept competitive; and a mandate that when considering the
inclusion of Plan investment options, fiduciaries will consider "(a)
the cost of different share classes available for any particular
mutual fund considered . . . and (b) the availability of revenue
sharing rebates on any share class available for any investment
option considered for inclusion in the Plan."92

B. Sweda v. University of Pennsylvania
Filed on August 10, 201693 in the United States District
Court for the District of Eastern Pennsylvania on the same day as
the case against Duke University, the University of Pennsylvania
(Penn) suit has been far more tumultuous, and its conclusion
remains uncertain.
The facts in the Penn case are roughly similar to those in the
Duke litigation. As of December 31, 2014, the Penn plan held $3.8
billion in assets for 21,412 plan participants,94 invested in 78
TIAA-CREF and Vanguard products.95 The Duke and Penn plans
included many of the same allegedly imprudent investment
products and fee arrangements with plan administrators and
investment recordkeepers. 96
The amended complaint also repeats many of the same
allegations. Penn is accused of causing plan participants financial
harm by failing to exercise prudence, by engaging in transactions
prohibited under ERISA, and failing to sufficiently monitor the
fiduciaries responsible for administering the plan.9 7 The district
court in the Penn case dismissed all counts.

92

Id. at 3-4.

93 Complaint-Class Action, supra note 12.

Amended Complaint, supra note 21, at 6.
Id. at 34.
96 See id. at 37. ("TIAA-CREF provided its 403(b) plan services exclusively on a
bundled basis. If a plan wished to offer the fixed TIAA Traditional Annuity, TIAACREF required that the CREF Stock Account and Money Market Account also be put
in the plan, and required the plan to use TIAA as recordkeeper for its proprietary
products."). Almost identical language is found in the Duke complaint. See Amended
Complaint, supra note 14, at 37.
97 Amended Complaint, supra note 21, at 2-3.
94

95
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As suggested by the University in a brief supporting its
motion to dismiss, the Penn court relied heavily on the Third
Circuit's opinion in Renfro v. Unisys Corporation.98 The breach of
fiduciary duty in Renfro was similar in many ways to that alleged
in the Penn case, albeit in relation to a 401(k) plan rather than a
403(b) plan. 99 The court, quoting Renfro, held that ERISA's
standards
. . . [require] plaintiffs to show more than just a single suboptimality in a given mutual fund. Instead, they must show
systemic mismanagement such that individuals are presented
with a Hobson's choice between a poorly-performing § 401(k)
portfolio or no § 401(k) at all. 100
The court further noted that, though 401(k) and 403(b) plans
had historically been treated somewhat differently, "those
differences have largely eroded over time. Today the obligation of
beneficiaries and fiduciaries in § 401(k) and § 403(b) plans are
nearly identical." 101
The court ultimately did not find that any of the claims met
the "plausibility" pleading standard as defined in Bell Aul. Corp. v.
Twombly.10 2 Particularly regarding the breach of fiduciary duty
claims, which allege imprudence by allowing unreasonable
recordkeeping fees, the court held:
98 Sweda v. Univ. of Pa., No. 2:16-cv-04329, 2017 WL 4179752, at*4-10 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 21, 2017)., aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 923 F.3d 320 (3rd Cir. 2019); Renfro v.
Unisys Corp., 671 F.3d 314 (3d Cir. 2011).
99 See 29 C.F.R. § 2530.201-2 (2021) (The principal difference between 401(k) and
403(b) plans is the identity of the plan sponsor. 401(k) plans can be sponsored by any
employer while 403(b) plans must be sponsored by not for profits, educational
institutions, religious organizations and/or some subdivisions of government. 403(b)
plans are also more restricted in what investment products they can offer. Assets in a
403(b) plan can only be placed in: an annuity contract provided through an insurance
company; a custodial account invested in mutual funds; or a retirement income account
set up for church employees.). See also Retirement Plans FAQs Regarding 403(b) TaxSheltered Annuity Plans, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/retirementplans/retirement-plans-faqs-regarding-403b-tax-sheltered-annuity-plans#participation
[https://perma.cc/FTF6-JHJA] (last visited Mar. 6, 2021).
1oo Sweda v. Univ. of Pa., No. 2:16-cv-04329, 2017 WL 4179752, at *10 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 21, 2017).
101 Id.
102 Id. at *11. Cf. Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 597 (8th Cir. 2009)
(citing to Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558-60 (2007), for that case's
implementation of a heightened pleading standard).
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With such low fees [in comparison to those noted in Renfro], it
is not inevitable to say that recordkeeping fees were
unnecessarily high, especially when there are rational
bundling reasons to allow separate recordkeepers. Even if
there were cheaper options available for recordkeeping fees,
ERISA mandates that fiduciaries consider options besides
cost. Fiduciaries must balance "providing benefits to
and "defraying
and their beneficiaries"
participants
reasonable expenses of administering the plan."103
The district court likewise applied this reasoning in support
of its conclusion that it was prudent to offer retail class shares
alongside cheaper institutional class shares,10 4 to employ multiple
recordkeepers (as opposed to just one),10 5 to offer duplicative
mutual fund options,1 0 6 and to maintain poorly performing
investment options within the plan.10 7 Renfro, the court held,
stood for the proposition that dismissal was appropriate when a
plan "offered a sufficient mix of investments . .
[such] that no
rational trier of fact could find, on the basis of the facts alleged in
the operative complaint, that the . . . defendants breached an
ERISA fiduciary duty by offering [that] particular array of
investment vehicles." 108 Possibly the most important conclusion in
the Renfro decision was an inference that "affording a reasonable
mix of plan options to participants was sufficient to meet the
fiduciary standard." 109
Plaintiffs appealed this decision to the Third Circuit, and
after reviewing the case de noro, a three-judge panel reversed the
district court in part, reviving claims relating to violations of the
duty of prudence in allowing unreasonable fees to be charged.110
The Third Circuit panel which heard the case was divided

Sweda, 2017 WL 4179752, at *8.
Id. at *9.
101 Id. at *8.
106 Id. at *9-10.
107 Id. at *10.
108 Renfro v. Unisys Corp., 671 F.3d 314, 320 (3d Cir. 2011).
109 See Sweda, 2017 WL 4179752, at *8.
110 Sweda v. Univ. of Pa., 923 F.3d 320, 340 (3d Cir. 2019) aff'g in part, rev'g in part,
2017 WL 4179752 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 2017).
103

104
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however, with Judge Roth, dissenting in part and concurring in
part.111
The majority felt that the district court judge had, as counsel
for Penn admitted in oral arguments, "painted outside the
lines,"11 2 noting that the Eighth Circuit in Braden v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 113 had declined to fully extend the heightened
pleading standard of Twombly 114 (an anti-trust case) to fiduciary
breach claims under ERISA. As the court noted approvingly as
noted in Braden, "[r]equiring a plaintiff to rule out every possible
lawful explanation for the conduct he challenges would invert the
principle that the complaint is construed most favorably to the
nonmoving party."115 Quoting Renfro, the majority emphasized:
"[W]e must examine the context of a claim, including the
underlying substantive law, in order to assess its plausibility."116
The majority did not believe that the decision to uphold dismissal
in Renfro controlled in the present case. The Third Circuit rejected
the lower court's interpretation of Renfro insofar as they read it to
hold that offering a "sufficient mix" of investment options was all
that was required to ensure compliance with ERISA's fiduciary
standards, stating:
[A] fiduciary breach claim must be examined against the
backdrop of the mix and range of available investment
options. We did not hold, however, [in Renfro] that a
meaningful mix and range of investment options insulates
plan fiduciaries from liability for breach of fiduciary duty.
Such a standard would allow a fiduciary to avoid liability by

111 Id.
112 Oral Argument at 36:25, Sweda v. Univ. of Pa., 923 F.3d 320, 340 (3d Cir 2019)
http://player.piksel.com/v/refid/3CA/prefid/17_3244 [https://perma.cc/2VZ8-87BZ].
113 Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 597 (8th Cir. 2009).
114 See supra note 73 (Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007), which
created an elevated pleading standard for anti-trust cases, and that standard was
extended to other kinds of civil suits by the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A consequence of this has been to make it significantly
harder for plaintiffs to survive 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss if the evidence needed to
prove their case is in the sole possession of the defendants.).
115 Sweda, 923 F.3d at 326 (citing Braden, 588 F.3d at 585).
116 Id. (citing Renfro v. Unisys Corp., 671 F.3d 314, 321 (3d Cir. 2011)).
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stocking a plan with hundreds of options, even if the majority
were overpriced or underperforming. 117
In her dissent, Judge Roth argued that the case was almost
identical to Renfro, and that following its precedent should result
in dismissal of all claims. 118 Finding that Renfro held an "ERISA
plan fiduciary acting in good faith, under the prudent person
standard, [does not] have a duty to do more than provide a wide,
reasonable, and low-cost variety of investment options for
individual plan beneficiaries . . . ." 119 Judge Roth seemed to
indicate that part of the justification for the elevated pleading
standard in Twombly would apply in the Penn case; and that "the
threat of discovery expense will push cost-conscious defendants to
settle . . . ."120 Judge Roth casted the district court's initial
decision, and her dissent on appeal, in the role of defending notfor-profit universities against purported frivolous "attorney-driven
litigation." 121
The majority, however, felt the defendants were required to
do more under ERISA than the defense's reading of Renfro seemed
to indicate. 122 The rationale for reviving the excessive and
unreasonable fee claims, the majority said was, "... if we were to
interpret Renfro to bar a complaint as detailed and specific as the
complaint here, we would insulate from liability every fiduciary
who, although imprudent, initially selected a 'mix and range' of
investment options. Neither the statute nor our precedent justifies
such a rule."123
After an attempt by Penn to obtain an en banc rehearing of
the case in the Third Circuit, the petition for the rehearing was
ultimately denied on July 19, 2019.124 As a result, the case has
officially been remanded back to the district court, with counts III

117

Id. at 330 (citation omitted).

See id. at 341-42 (Roth, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
See id. at 341 (Roth, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
120 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007).
121 Sweda, 923 F.3d at 344 (Roth, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
122 See id. at 326-27.
123 Id. at 334.
124 Order Denying Petition for Panel and En Banc Rehearing at 2, 923 F.3d 320, 340
(3d Cir. 2019) (No. 17-3244).
118
119
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and V revived. 125 The case will soon resume in the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania with the reinstated
counts, and plaintiffs class counsel in similar suits will certainly
point to this decision as they seek to progress toward a favorable
judgment for their clients.

C. Sacerdote. v. New York University
This class action suit was brought against fiduciaries of
ERISA covered 403(b) retirement benefit plans 12 6 sponsored by
New York University (NYU) on August 9, 2016, and shares many
qualities with the other university ERISA cases filed in federal
courts that same month. 127 As in the other cases, plaintiffs
claimed violations of ERISA standards including: breach of duty of
prudence by allowing investment providers and recordkeepers to
charge excessive and unreasonable fees,128 engaging in
transactions prohibited under ERISA, 129 and failing to monitor the
plans and the co-fiduciaries charged with administering those
plans.130
Sacerdote presents a troubling issue that gets to the heart of
arguments in favor of strict enforcement of ERISA fiduciary
standards as crucial to meaningful protection of plan participants
and beneficiaries: potentially conflicted fiduciaries. 131
The case was heard in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York in front of Judge Katherine B.
Forrest. 132 In contrast to the Penn case described above, at the
pleading stage, the court found plaintiffs had met their burden to
proceed with their claims of breach of prudence relating to
125 Breach of fiduciary duties for unreasonable administrative fees, in violation of 29
U.S.C. § 1104 (a)(1) (Count III), and breach of fiduciary duties for unreasonable fees in
violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (Count V). See also Amended Complaint, supra note
21.
126 NYU maintained two separate plans, one for the faculty and staff of its medical
school, and another for the rest of the university. See Amended Complaint, supra note
22, at 8-9.
127 See Complaint-Class Action, supra note 12, at 6.
128 Amended Complaint, supra note 22, at 56-78.
129

Id. at 106-07.

Id. at 112-14.
See id. at 2-3.
132 See Sacerdote v. N.Y. Univ., 1:16-cv-06284-KBF, 2017 WL 3701482 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 25, 2017).
13o

131
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excessive fees as alleged in the amended complaint. 133 The court
cited Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.134 in its discussion of the
pleading standard, noting that ERISA cases are given some
leeway with the Twombly13 5 standard, "because plaintiffs
'generally lack the inside information necessary to make out their
claims in detail unless and until discovery commences."'136 The
plaintiffs' claims that the university defendants breached its duty
of loyalty were dismissed, however, once again citing Braden.137 In
that case, breach of loyalty claims had survived because plaintiffs
had alleged that Wal-Mart Stores had deliberately concealed
conflicts and malfeasance, but no such claim was made in the

NYU case. 138
The case then proceeded to a bench trial, and it remains the
only one of the ERISA university cases to be fully tried on the
merits. 139 At the conclusion of the trial, Judge Forrest dismissed
the remaining claims in their entirety. 140 During the eight-day
bench trial, investment experts presented testimony from both
sides to evaluate the processes employed by NYU to administer
the plans.141 The NYU litigation demonstrates why the validity of
the excessive and unreasonable fee claims could not be determined
at the pleading stage. The arguments were highly fact intensive,
and the result may ultimately have been determined by whose
version of the "facts" Judge Forrest found more convincing.
Testimony by Margaret Meagher, one of the co-chairs of the
Retirement Plan Committee (Committee) since its inception, did
not impress Judge Forrest:
Meagher's testimony was concerning. She made it clear that
she viewed her role as primarily concerned with scheduling,
paper movement, and logistics; she displayed a surprising

lack of in-depth knowledge concerning the financial aspects of
managing a multi-billion-dollar pension portfolio and a lack of
Amended Complaint, supra note 22, at 56-78. at 104-05.
134 See generally Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585 (8th Cir. 2009).
135 See generally Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
136 Sacerdote, 2017 WL 3701482, at *3 (citation omitted).
137 Id. at *6.
133

138
139
140

Id.
See Sacerdote v. N.Y. Univ., 328 F. Supp. 3d 273, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
Id. at 317.

141 See id. at 281-83.
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true appreciation for the significance of her role as a fiduciary
. . . . For instance, she testified that it was entirely
appropriate for her, as well as the other Committee members,
to rely upon Cammack [an independent investment advisor
hired by the plan] to determine the reasonableness of fees and
that she did not do anything to test the reliability of their
information. She bluntly testified that "[i]t's not my job to
determine whether the fees are appropriate" for the Plans. 142
Judge Forrest was likewise unimpressed by the testimony of
Nancy Sanchez, Meagher's direct supervisor, and a fellow
Committee member:
Sanchez . . . was similarly unfamiliar with basic concepts
relating to the Plans . . . . [w]hen asked about her inability to
remember Plan details, Sanchez responded that she has a
"big job" (referring to her human resources role, not her
Committee membership) and that her role on the Committee
is one of many responsibilities she has. This suggested that
Sanchez does not view herself as having adequate time to
serve effectively on the Committee.
Sanchez further testified that she did not "know enough about
variable annuities to be able to comment on whether they
should be in these plans," and she could not recall whether
there were "specific underperformance metrics or thresholds
that have to be triggered for a fund to be put on the watch
list." When asked who the plan administrator was, she
responded, "I don't review the plan documents. That's what I
have staff for." Specifically, she noted that Meagher is the
"one that reviews the plan documents for [her]." 143
The duty of prudence under ERISA requires a fiduciary to act
"with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the
circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like
capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct
of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims."144 The
"'prudent person' standard asks whether 'the individual trustees,
at the time they engaged in the challenged transactions, employed

142

143

Id. at 291 (citation omitted).
Id.

144 29 U.S.C.A.

§

1104(a)(1)(B) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 116-259).
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the appropriate methods to investigate the merits of the
investment and to structure the investment.'"145 Judge Forrest
later noted in a separate opinion that, "[f]iduciaries' prudence is
measured against an objective standard, and their own 'lack of
familiarity with investments is no excuse' for failing to act with
the care, skill, prudence and diligence required under the
circumstances then prevailing." 146
Nevertheless, Judge Forrest noted that, while "the level of
involvement and seriousness with which several Committee
members treated their fiduciary duty [was] troubling, [the court]
does not find that this rose to a level of failure to fulfill fiduciary
obligations." 147 Evidence presented at trial showed that the
Committee considered and rejected consolidation to a single
recordkeeper but determined this action would be imprudent at
the time after a cost/benefit analysis taking into account the
disruption it would cause to the plans. 148 Judge Forrest also
pointed to testimony which indicated that the plan had actually
reduced recordkeeping costs per participant over several years,
even while the number of participants was increasing. 149
There was a "battle of the experts" over the merits of
plaintiffs' proposition that plan fiduciaries had failed to reduce
plan recordkeeping costs to a reasonable level. 150 Judge Forrest
stated in her decision that she did not find either of Plaintiffs'
expert witnesses to be "reliable expert[s]" and that the court "[did]
not rely on [their] testimony" discussing the merits of flat fee
recordkeeping arrangements compared to revenue sharing
models 151 or on whether certain products underperformed.1 52 This
rejection of the expert testimony proved fatal to plaintiffs' key
claim that the recordkeeping fees paid by the plan were
unreasonable and excessive.

145 Sacerdote v. N.Y. Univ., 1:16-cv-06284-KBF, 2017 WL 3701482, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 25, 2017) (quoting Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 279 (2d Cir. 1984)).
146 Sacerdote v. N.Y. Univ., 328 F. Supp. 3d 273, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (citing
Katsaros, 744 F.2d at 279).
147 Id. at 293.
148
149

150
151
152

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 298.
at 300.
at 305-06.
at 305.
at 312 n.112.
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Judge Forrest likewise rejected as without sufficient evidence
plaintiffs' claims that certain products included in the plan (e.g.,
the CREF Stock Account and TIAA Real Estate Separate Account)
were imprudent investments. 153 She cited the wide adoption of the
challenged products in the market as evidence that they were not
objectively imprudent. 154 Ultimately, Judge Forrest did not find
sufficient evidence that plaintiffs had suffered any loss related to
a fiduciary breach by NYU, and the case was dismissed on July
31, 2018.155
Following this decision, Judge Forrest's objectivity was
brought into question. On September 12, 2018 (less than two
months after rendering judgment on the NYU claims), Judge
Forrest announced that she was leaving the bench for a
partnership at Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLC, where she had
been a partner prior to her nomination to the court. 156 The
potential significance of this event involved one Evan Chesler.157
Mr. Chesler, Cravath's chairman and Judge Forrest's mentor
during her earlier career at the firm, was on the NYU board of
trustees during the period in question in the lawsuit. 158 He is
known as a passionate advocate for the University. 159 As a board
member, "Mr. Chesler is a Principal of NYU."160 The timing of
Judge Forrest's return to Cravath suggests she may have been
considering this career shift while presiding over the lawsuit, the
outcome of which would be of significance to her longtime mentor
and potential employer. 161
Plaintiffs filed a motion for a rehearing of the case, alleging,
"Judge Forrest was disqualified from presiding over this case once
she decided to leave the bench because she was considering as her
153 Id. at 312.
154 Id. ("It is notable that TIAA Real Estate account is also widely accepted as an
appropriate and desirable investment by other market participants.").
155 Id. at 316-17 (". . . that exhibit supports Fischel's conclusion regarding the
market acceptance of the CREF Stock Account").
156 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate Judgment and for New
Trial at 2, Sacerdote v. N.Y. Univ., 1:16-cv-06284-RWS (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2018), ECF
No. 358.
157
158
159
160
161

Id. at 1.
Id. at 1, 22.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 4 (referring to NYU's Charter).
Id. at 2.
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only choice the possibility of an employment relationship at a firm
chaired by a NYU Trustee with direct responsibility for
monitoring the fiduciary conduct at issue at the same time she
was deciding a case against NYU."162 They do not specifically
allege that Judge Forrest acted in an unethical manner, but
rather that the law required her recusal because the
circumstances raised questions of impartiality. Quoting 28 U.S.C.
Section 455(a), the motion for rehearing stated, "[a] judge 'shall
disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality
might reasonably be questioned."' 163
When Judge Forrest retired, the case was reassigned to
Judge Sweet, who heard the motion for rehearing. 164 However,
before issuing an opinion, Judge Sweet died. 165 The case was then
reassigned once more to Judge Torres, who ultimately ruled
against vacating the judgment and ordering a new trial. 166 Judge
Torres, in her conclusion, stated, "The Court agrees with
Defendant that 'no well-informed observer would have any reason
to believe that Judge Forrest had any incentive to rule for NYU in
this case in order to advance her legal career or ingratiate herself
with Cravath to allow her to return to Cravath as a partner."' 167
The final decision of the district court has now been appealed
by plaintiffs and is awaiting adjudication in the Second Circuit. 168
While the allegations of impropriety on behalf of Judge
Forrest do not appear to have gained traction, they do highlight
one of major issues which lurk in the background of these cases.
While the defendant universities are not-for-profit organizations,
they are also massive institutions managed by boards, whose
members often have divided loyalties. The universities owe a
fiduciary duty to the participants in their retirement plans;

Id. at 19.
Id. at 16.
164 Sacerdote v. N.Y. Univ., 1:16-cv-06284-RWS, 2019 WL 2763922, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
July 1, 2019).
166 See Joseph P. Fried, Robert W. Sweet, Mayor's Deputy Turned Federal Judge, Is
Dead at 96, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/25/obituaries
/robert-w-sweet-dead.html [https://perma.cc/8NLC-UELP].
166 See Sacerdote, 2019 WL 2763922, at *1.
167 Id. at *7.
168 Notice of Appeal at 1, Sacerdote v. N.Y. Univ., 1:16-cv-06284-KBF (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 11, 2018), ECF No. 355.
162
163
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however, in a very real sense, the board of trustees "is" the
university. Board members often come from the upper echelons of
the private sector, and the interests of the university as an
institution, along with private interests of the board members can
create additional problems, as the final case study- Tracey r.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology -amply demonstrates.

D. Tracey v. MassachusettsInstitute of Technology

.

Filed on August 9, 2016,169 the same day as the case against
NYU, the suit against the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT) is in many respects similar to the other three case studies
discussed above. As of December 31, 2014, the MIT retirement
plan managed $3.6 billion in assets for 18,268 participants, spread
across some 340 financial products. 170 The plaintiff class accused
the defendants of causing them financial harm by allowing the
plan to be charged excessive and unreasonable fees through
engaging in prohibited transactions with parties in interest and
failing to monitor their co-fiduciaries.1 7 1
The MIT case also presents some unique characteristics.
First, of all the cases we examined, MIT is the only defendant
university which employed a single recordkeeper to manage its
403(b) plan assets. 172 This is important because one of the
consistent features of the other class action suits are the
assertions that employing multiple recordkeepers was an
impermissibly imprudent decision which caused plans to pay
duplicative fees, and prevented plans from leveraging their
massive, aggregated assets into a better deal. 173 MIT's only
recordkeeper during the time in question was Fidelity. 174 The
amended complaint aptly summarized the accusation as thus: "..
instead of acting solely in the interest of participants, Defendants

169
170
171

172

Complaint-Class Action, supra note 4.
Amended Complaint, supra note 78, at 5, 27.
Id. at 2, 27.
See id. at 2.

See Amended Complaint, supra note 14, at 38.; Amended Complaint, supra note
22, at 37; Amended Complaint, supra note 21 at 38.
174 Amended Complaint, supra note 74, at 2.
173
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Prior to a reformation of the plan in July of 2015, MIT's
retirement plan included over 340 investment products, most of
them mutual funds.176 Included amongst these were 180
proprietary Fidelity funds, which the Amended Complaint states
were "nearly every mutual fund that Fidelity offered."177 While
MIT argues that they were merely offering a wide range of
investment options, the Plaintiffs alleged:
The Plan's 340-fund lineup included an overwhelming array

of duplicative funds in the same investment styles, which
diluted the Plan's ability to obtain significantly lower fees by
offering a single option in each investment style, and provided
a confusing menu of options that impaired participants'
ability to make investment decisions. 178

Plaintiffs noted that, during the class period (prior to the
2015 plan reorganization), the plan was rife with actively
managed funds which charged fees up to 15,000% higher than
comparable passive funds which were available on the market. 179
Plaintiffs cited statements made by MIT during the 2015
reorganization of the plan in which MIT said that the "revised
investment lineup allowed the Plan to 'leverage MIT's
institutional purchasing power to offer both passively and actively
managed options at the best possible cost for participants,' and in
some cases, provide funds 'in a better share class with lower

fees."' 180
If these changes were prudent in 2015, the Amended
Complaint asserts, they were prudent long before that, and failure
to take these considerations into account during the period at
issue in the suit cost plan participants millions of dollars in
excessive fees, which by their calculations was $8 million in 2014
alone. 181 Behind this assertion lurks a more insidious attack. The
175 Amended Complaint, supra note 78, at 34.

180

Id. at 33-34.
Id.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 68 (citation omitted).

181

Amended Complaint, supra note 74, at 64.

176

177
178
179
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Plaintiffs seemed to stop just short of alleging that it was a
violation of ERISA to offer actively managed mutual funds in the
plan at all. Citing the research of Nobel Prize winning economists
whose research shows "virtually no investment manager
consistently beats the market over time after fees are taken into
account," 182 Plaintiffs concluded:
...

investment costs are of paramount importance to prudent

investment selection, and a prudent investor will not select
higher-cost actively managed funds without a documented
process to realistically conclude that the fund is likely to be
that extremely rare exception, if one even exists, that will
outperform its benchmark index over time, net of investment
expenses.183

These assertions fly in the face of the popular narrative of
savvy brokers beating the market for investors, but that does not
make them inaccurate. Prudence, however, is ostensibly measured
objectively under ERISA. That is, actions are judged based on how
a "'prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such
matters' would act under the circumstances."1 84 With such
widespread inclusion of relatively expensive actively managed
funds in 401(k) and 403(b) plans, the allegation that they are
objectively imprudent has been hard to make.
The allegations against MIT highlight what plaintiffs
consider to be an uncomfortably close relationship between
Fidelity and MIT. The complaint cited several examples including:
a. Since Fidelity was selected as the Plan's recordkeeper,
Fidelity Foundation has donated hundreds of thousands of
dollars to MIT.
b.

. .

. [S]ince

2001,

Fidelity Non-Profit

Management

Foundation has donated over $18 million to MIT.
c. . . . [A] Fidelity-related entity for which former CEO
Edward C. Johnson III and current CEO Abigail Johnson

182
183

184

Id. at 19.
Id. at 21.
MOORE, supra note 81, at 206.
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serve as trustees, the Edward C. Johnson Fund, has made
additional donations....
d. In 2010, the Edward C. Johnson Fund contributed
$220,000 for "Conservation-Arts & Sciences' and $25,000 for
"Program Support" to MIT. 185
The plaintiffs also cite to a news report from the period in
which Fidelity was selected to manage the plan in which an MIT
spokesperson said Fidelity was chosen because they wanted to
select a provider who "did business" with MIT. 186
The magistrate judge who issued the order on the motion to
dismiss was not convinced that this amounted to fiduciary breach,
saying:
Defendants . . . correctly assert that, "Mere officer or director
status does not create an imputed breach of the duty of
loyalty simply because an officer or director has an
understandable interest in positive performance of company
stock' . . . [in the case cited] the court found no evidence . .
that 'high-ranking company officials sold company stock while
using the Company Fund to purchase more shares, or that the
Company Fund was being used for the purpose of propping up
the stock price in the market." 187

The case proceeded toward trial with only the excessive fee
and duty of prudence breach claims intact (and failure to monitor
fiduciaries, as relating to those claims), 188 but the relationship
between Fidelity and MIT still highlights one of the fundamental
issues in each of these suits: the sponsoring employers "put the
foxes in charge of the henhouse" by turning the whole process of
managing the 403(b) plan over to a company whose primary goal
is to maximize their own profits from administration of the plan.
In October 2019, the parties reached a preliminary settlement of

Amended Complaint, supra note 74, at 31.
Id. (citing Fidelity Chosen to Manage MIT Supplemental 401(k) Plan as of April
1, MIT NEWS (Dec. 16, 1998), http://news.mit.edu/1998/401k-1216 [https://perma.cc/8R
KN-S49V]).
187 Tracey v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 1:16-11620-NMG, 2017 WL 4453541, at *12 (D.
Mass. Aug. 31, 2017).
185
186

188

Id. at 19.
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$18.1 million, the largest in this large group of class actions. 189
The MIT case exposes the uneasy tripartite relationship of
university/plan sponsors, recordkeepers (Fidelity) and major
donors (Fidelity leadership). One could be forgiven for concluding
that, in exchange for selecting Fidelity, MIT leadership was
rewarded with generous capital gifts to its major fundraising
initiatives. The price of this arrangement was ostensibly paid for
by plan participants in the form of higher fees over many years.
IV. EXCESSIVE FEE CLAIMS-SHOULD ACTIVELY MANAGED
FUNDS ALWAYS BE EXCLUDED FROM § 403(B) PLANS?

To answer the question of what role, if any, actively managed
funds should play in 403(b) plans, it is critical to consider the socalled Fiduciary Rule, scholarly work on the justification for fees
associated with actively managed funds, the large menu defense,
and the Gartenbergprecedent. We consider each in turn.

A. A Short History of the Short-Lived FiduciaryRule
"Fiduciary duties are duties enforced by law and imposed on
persons in certain relationships requiring them to act entirely in
the interest of another . . . and not in their own interest." 190 The
1975 Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) included
those who "renderH investment advice for a fee or other
compensation" amongst the relationships which created a
fiduciary duty. 19 1 The law includes a five-factor test, applying
fiduciary duty to one who: (1) provide[s] advice as to the value of
securities or other property, (2) on a regular basis, (3) pursuant to
a mutual agreement or understanding with the plan or plan
fiduciary that (4) the advice will serve as a primary basis for
investment decisions and (5) the advice is individualized to the
particular needs of the plan or IRA.192 This rigid text left many

189 See Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Settlement,
supra note 36, at 2.
190 David J. Seipp, Trust and FiduciaryDuty in the Early Common Law, 91 B.U. L.
REV. 1011, 1011 (2011).
191 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(21)(A)(ii) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 116-259).
192 29 C.F.R. § 2510-3-21(c)(1)(ii)(B) (2021).
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investment
professionals,
consultants,
and
broker-dealer
"advisers" without any fiduciary duty to their clients. 193
In the wake of the 2008 recession, the United States
Congress passed the financial reform legislation "Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act" (Dodd-Frank),
which included a requirement that the SEC create a report within
six months that would detail the professional standards brokers,
dealers, and investment advisors were currently employed, and
make recommendations for reforms.1 94 A 2011 SEC report
recommended the implementation of a uniform fiduciary standard
of conduct for all brokers, dealers, and investment advisers, when
providing personalized investment advice about securities to retail
customers, to act in the best interest of the customer without
regard to the financial or other interest of the broker, dealer, or
investment adviser providing the advice. 195
On April 8, 2016, the Department of Labor (DOL) issued a
rule that expanded the definition of investment advice within
employer-sponsored private-sector pension plans and Individual
Retirement Accounts. 196 The effective date of the rule was June 7,
2016, with applicability slated for April 10, 2017.197 The final rule

193 Definition
of the Term "Fiduciary"; Conflict of Interest Rule-Retirement
Investment Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,946 (Apr. 8, 2016) (vacated Mar. 15, 2018).
194 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, sec. 913(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1824.
195 U.S. SEC.& EXCH. COMM'N, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISORS AND BROKER-

DEALERS: AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 913 OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM

AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT ii (2011), https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913s
tudyfinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/3AT2-X5MB].
196 See Definition of the Term "Fiduciary"; Conflict of Interest Rule-Retirement
Investment Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,946 (Apr. 8, 2016) (vacated Mar. 15, 2018). Phyllis
Borzi, an assistant labor secretary during the Obama administration, devoted
significant resources to promoting a fiduciary standard which would require ERISA
fiduciaries to put clients' financial interests ahead of their own. She became familiar
with the issue "in the 1970s when, as a law student, she got a part-time job at a
consulting firm helping clients understand [ERISA], which was new at the time." As a
congressional staffer, she composed a large section of the 1985 COBRA legislation, and
once in the DOL she fought tooth and nail against entrenched resistance from those
allied with the financial services industry in pursuit of stricter fiduciary rules to
protect retiree nest eggs. Yuka Hayashi, Financial-Advice Rule Has an Unlikely
Champion, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.rebalance360.com/news/financialadvice-rule-has-an-unlikely-champion/ [https://perma.cc/6CGR-5675].
197 Definition
of the Term "Fiduciary"; Conflict of Interest Rule-Retirement
Investment Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,946 (Apr. 8, 2016) (vacated Mar. 15, 2018).
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eliminated the five-factor test which had determined when
"investment advice" had been provided (thus triggering fiduciary
status) and replaced it with a broader definition that would
capture more activity. Two important criteria were dropped: the
advice had to be on a "regular basis" and be the "primary basis"
for investment choices. The rule would have applied fiduciary duty
to "virtually all financial and insurance professionals who do
business with ERISA and IRA" plans. 1 98
On February 3, 2017, President Trump
issued a
memorandum instructing the DOL to review the rule and revise
or rescind it based on its findings.199 Then, on April 7, 2017, the
DOL issued a 60-day delay of the rule's applicability. 200 Before the
rule could go into effect, it was vacated by a decision of the Fifth
Circuit. 201
DOL Secretary Alexander Acosta, who had been working on a
revised fiduciary rule, resigned from his post effective July 19,
2019. His replacement, Eugene Scalia, who was lead counsel for
the trade group which was instrumental in the defeat of the 2016
rule, appeared unlikely to push the DOL to resurrect efforts to
expand fiduciary duties beyond those designated under the 1975
ERISA legislation. 20 2
On June 5, 2019, the SEC announced new "regulation best
interest" rules governing the relationship between financial
professionals and consumers:
[D]esigned to enhance and clarify the standards of conduct
applicable to broker-dealers and investment advisers, help
retail investors better understand and compare the services
offered and make an informed choice of the relationship best
suited to their needs and circumstances, and foster greater

198 Chamber of Commerce v. U.S. Dep't. of Labor, 885 F.3d 360, 366 (5th Cir. 2018)
(vacating 2016 fiduciary rule).
199 Presidential Memorandum on Fiduciary Duty Rule, 2017 DAILY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 95 (Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-201700095/pdf/DCP
D-201700095.pdf [https://perma.cc/J4SZ-FBFW].
200 Definition
of the Term "Fiduciary"; Conflict of Interest Rule-Retirement
Investment Advice, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,902, 16,905 (Apr. 7, 2017).
201 Chamberof Commerce, 885 F.3d at 388.
202 See Editorial Board, Gene Scalia's Winning Record, WALL ST.
J., (July 19, 2019),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/gene-scalias-winning-record- 11563575256
[https://perma.cc/THP4-ZCYZ].

2021]

UNIVERSITY FEE LITIGATION

483

consistency in the level of protections provided by each
regime,

particularly

at

the

point

in

time

that

a

recommendation is made. 203
There is concern however that while the SEC regulation
requires broker-dealers to act in the "best interests" of their
customers and make new disclosures which they had not
previously been required to make, there is no definition of what
"best interest" means, and the standard is still different from that
applied to investment advisors, a difference which creates
confusion amongst retail investors about their rights.20 4
Since the demise of the DOL's original fiduciary rule, several
states have moved to enact their own rules expanding fiduciary
duty to licensed finance professionals in their states who are
marketing and selling their own company's products. 20 5 The
financial services sector is, reportedly, working to thwart these
efforts alleging that it will raise costs and "limit access" to
investment opportunities. 20 6
Finally, in June of 2020 the DOL announced a new proposed
rule change which would grant an exception allowing financial
firms which provide investment products to ERISA qualified plans
to receive "reasonable compensation." 20 7 The DOL portrays this

203 Press Release, Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, SEC Adopts Rules and Interpretations to
Enhance Protections and Preserve Choice for Retail Investors in Their Relationships
with Financial Professionals (June 5, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/20
19-89 [https://perma.cc/FJT5-6SB5].
204 See Bob Pisani, A Breakdown of Whether Investors Are Safer After the SEC
Passes FinancialProtection Rule, CNBC: TRADER TALK (June 6, 2019, 4:44 PM) https://
www.cnbc.com/2019/06/06/a-breakdown-of-whether-investors-are-safer-after-the-sec-pa
sses-financial-protection-rule.html [https://perma.cc/X2K7-RNNW].
205 See 2017 Nev. Stat. 1795 (Nevada rule "imposing a fiduciary duty on brokerdealers, sales representatives and investment advisers who for compensation advise
other persons concerning the investment of money"); 2019 Mass. Regulation Text
11392, (Massachusetts rule deeming it an unethical or dishonest conduct or practice for
a broker-dealer, agent, investment adviser, or investment adviser representative
registered or required to be registered in Massachusetts to fail to act in accordance
with a fiduciary duty to a customer or client); 2018-31 N.Y. Reg. 19 (Aug. 1, 2018),
(New York rule applying suitability/best interest standard to sales of annuities and life
insurance).
206 See Kenneth E. Bentsen, Jr., State Fiduciary Rules Will Raise Costs, Limit
Access, SIFMA (Jan. 8, 2020), https://www.sifma.org/resources/news/state-fiduciary-rul
es-will-raise-costs-limit-access [https://perma.cc/FK5L-4MAP].
207

See infra note 211.
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rule change as good for investors. In a press release announcing
the rule, Secretary Scalia said, "Today's proposed exemption
would give Americans more choices for investment advice
arrangements, while protecting the retirement savings of
American workers . . . . [t]he exemption would add to the tools
individuals need to make the right decisions for their financial
future." 20 8 There are several troubling aspects to this latest
proposed rule, however. First, as has been mentioned, the purpose
of ERISA is to protect investors from those who would seek to
abuse their confidence, not to provide more "choice." 209 Second,
requiring financial advisors to disclose their conflicts of interest is
not a valid substitute for prohibiting those conflicts. Jacob Russell
has noted that not only do disclosures fail to mitigate the potential
harms brought about by conflicted advisors, but disclosures can
worsen advisor behavior by creating a safe harbor for conflicted
behavior. 210
While this proposed rule is couched as a "replacement" for the
Obama administration's universal fiduciary rule which was
defeated in the Fifth Circuit,211 it is viewed by many consumer
advocates as a gift to the financial services industry. Senator
Patty Murray from Washington, a ranking member of the Senate
Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee, criticized the
proposed exemption saying, "[i]nstead of moving ahead with this
proposal that will leave people across the country vulnerable, the
Department should go back to the drawing board and come up
with one that actually protects them and meets the high standard
that Congress mandated in ERISA."212 In contrast, Kenneth

208 News Release, U.S. Dep't of Labor, U.S. Department of Labor Proposes to
Improve Investment Advice and Enhance Financial Choices for Workers and Retirees
(June 29, 2020), https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/ebsa/ebsa20200629 [https://per
ma.cc/7UDA-T6UK].
209 See in/r note 227.
210 Jacob Hale Russell, The Separation of Intelligence and Control: Retirement
Savings and the Limits of Soft Paternalism, 6 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REv. 35, 78-79
(2015) (citing to Daylian Cain, George Loewenstein & Don Moore, The Dirt on Coming
Clean: Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2005)).
211 See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
212 Warren Rojas, Consumer Groups Gear Up to Fight Trump's Retirement Advice
Rule, BLOOMBERG LAW (July 1, 2020, 4:45 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/employ
ee-benefits/consumer-groups-gear-up-to-fight-trumps-retirement-advice-rule [https://pe
rma.cc/SL3A-ZCCZ].
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Bentsen, Jr., president and CEO of SIFMA, praised the rule,
stating, "We applaud the Department of Labor's work to preserve
investor choice."213

B. Fees and § 403(b) Plans
More than a few scholars have noted the persistence of high
fee options in mutual funds and defined contribution 401(k) and
403(b) plans.2 14 Morrissey, 215 Ayres, 2 16 Schwartz and Herman, 2 17
213

Id.

Cf. 29 C.F.R. § 2530 (2021). The primary difference between 401(k) and 403(b)
plans is who sponsors them. 401(k) plans can be sponsored by any employer while
403(b) plans are only able to be sponsored by not for profits, educational institutions,
religious organizations, and some subdivisions of government. 403(b) plans are also
more restricted in what investment products they can offer, primarily mutual funds
and annuities.
21s Daniel J. Morrissey, Reforming Wall Street's Biggest Gravy Train: Making
Mutual Funds Fiduciaries for Retirement Savers, 47 SECURITIES REG. L. J. 1 (2019)
(arguing that given the political climate, we are unlikely to see additional regulation of
mutual funds; however, litigation appears to be a promising vehicle to remedy some of
the more egregious issues with excessive fees). The biggest barrier for litigation
plaintiffs will be the Supreme Court's decision in Jones v. HarrisAssoc., 559 U.S. 335
(2010), which seems to suggest that it is impossible to prove excessive fees if the entire
industry is charging at the same (high) level. Id. See also Daniel J. Morrissey, Are
Mutual Funds Robbing Retirement Savings?, 14 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 143, 175 (2017)
("[O]ver their lifetimes a typical dual-income couple will pay more than $150,000 in
fees on their 401(k) plans."). As for disclosures, "one observer said about the 'farcical'
nature of those [mutual fund fee] disclosures, '[the prospectuses run] a hundred pages
in length, bloated with regurgitated boilerplate. They are often squirreled away on
obscure websites visited by only a handful of investors and understood by fewer."' Id. at
177.
216 See Ian Ayres & Quinn Curtis, Beyond Diversification: The Pervasive Problem of
Excessive Fees and "DominatedFunds" in 401(k) Plans, 124 YALE L.J. 1476. (2015) (a
comprehensive account of the regulatory failures in the retirement plan area). Ayres
notes that "naive diversification" causes investors to spread their investment across a
wide range of investment options, including those with extremely high fees. Id. at 1481.
This is especially troubling as there is no evidence which suggests that actively
managed, high fee options produce better returns over time than low cost options. In
short, the evidence suggests that holding funds with high fees has a "significant,
persistent and negative effect on investor[/retiree] returns." Id. at 1489. See also, Ian
Ayres & Edward Fox, Alpha Duties: The Search for Excess Returns and Appropriate
FiduciaryDuties, 97 TEX. L. REv. 445, 448 (2017). The authors say that absent some
compelling opportunity to beat the index, there is a general consensus that investors
"should invest in vehicles... that are (1) well-diversified, (2) low-cost, and (3) expose
[an investor's] portfolio to age-appropriate stock market risk[s]." Id.
217 Daniel J. Schwartz and Jeffrey A. Herman, Funds, Fees, and Annuities A
Guide to 403(b) Investment Options, 29 TAxATION OF EXEMPTS 23, 24 (2018) ("In 2015,
214
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Belenky, 2 18 and Morley and Curtis 2 19 have all noted the
prevalence and persistence of inordinately high fees and the
simultaneous absence of data which suggests that actively
managed funds outperform their lower cost passively managed
counterparts. To be sure, some have also offered questionable
defenses of the socially valuable role high fees play. 2 2 0
The central issues are well identified and there is significant
data to support a conclusion that actively managed funds do not
perform better over time than low cost, passively managed
funds. 221 In academic communities, it is simply inconceivable that
this information has escaped the notice of university
administrators and fiduciaries. Despite this, the more than twenty
lawsuits that have been filed against prominent academic
institutions alleging, variously, multiple failures with respect to
the duties of prudence and loyalty as well as allegations of various

403(b) plans averaged 25 investment options .... On average, colleges and universities
have the most options, compared to plans sponsored by other types of employers.")
Actively managed funds are the most expensive overall, with an assetweighted average expense ratio of about 0.80% . . . . In contrast, the assetweighted average for index equity mutual funds (which are passively
managed) was a scant 0.09% . . . . [i]ndex funds increased from just 7.5% of
net assets invested in mutual funds in 2000, to 1 9 .3 % in 2016.
Id. at 27.
218 Matt Belenky, The DOL's Fiduciary Duty Role in Universities, INSIDE BASIS,
Winter 2018, at 11. (noting that in Tibble v. Edison International, 135 S. Ct. 1823
(2015), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 135 S. Ct. 1823 (2015), the United
States Supreme Court found that fiduciaries have an ongoing duty to monitor plans
and to eliminate imprudent investments). Without clear guidance on the scope of the
duty to monitor, it is hard to know what a failure to monitor looks like. Belenky argues
in favor of "[h]olding fiduciaries to a higher standard about the investment products
[they sell, which] will save companies millions in potential class action suits and
protect employees from losing money on their retirement plans.").
219 Quinn Curtis & John Morley, Flawed Mechanics of Mutual Fund
Fee Litigation,
32 YALE J. REG. 1, 3 (2015). Focusing on mutual funds as a whole not just in relation to
403(b) plans, the authors argue that, "mutual funds are the elephants in the room of
American finance." Id. They propose the development of a mechanical, easy to apply
test that would allow class action plaintiffs to show that fees are substantially above
market norms and permit an award of penalties in addition to actual damages. Id. at
43-44.
220 See, e.g., Michael A. Habib & D. Bruce Johnsen, The Quality-Assuring Role of
Mutual Fund Advisory Fees, 46 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 1, 13 (2016) (noting mutual fund
managers need to earn fees to incentivize them to perform effective research).
221 See Morrissey,
supra note 215, at 180; see also Ayres & Quinn, Beyond
Diversification, supra note 216, 1517-18.
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prohibited transactions suggest otherwise. Almost invariably, only
claims relating to prudence have survived.

C. The "LargeMenu" Defense
At the heart of the university fee litigation cases is a
philosophical question about whether and how participants should
be in control of their investment choices. Most of the defendant
universities have rationalized the large range of options offered to
participants (both low and high fees) as placing the participant in
control of his investment decisions. 2 2 2 There is some judicial
support for this view. For example, both the Seventh Circuit in
Hecker v. Deere22 3 and Renfro v. Unisys 2 2 4 from the Third Circuit
adopt the view that choice is an unqualified benefit for
participants.
As Professor Bullard has noted, 22 5 federal courts have
repeatedly and erroneously affirmed the idea that a wide choice
set in the pension context is inherently virtuous. He notes:
The [so called] large menu defense effectively substitutes
judicial economic theories for statutory fiduciary duties, based
primarily on the court's ideological view . . . that participants'
choices should be regulated by free market principles rather
than under ERISA's fiduciary duties. The courts' view,
consistent with widely accepted rational choice theory, is that
offering the largest range of choices will maximize workers'
wealth. Indeed, they view increasing choice, in and of itself,
as the central purpose of ERISA. 226

222 See, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs' Consolidated Amended Complaint at 14, Cates v. Trs. of Columbia Univ., No.
1:16-cv-06524-KBF, 2017 WL 3724296 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2017) (consolidated with Doe
v. Columbia Univ., No. 1:16-cv-06488 (S.D.N.Y. filed Aug 16, 2017) ("Because
participant choice is the centerpiece of what ERISA envisions for defined-contribution
plans, these sorts of paternalistic arguments have had little traction in the courts.")
(quoting Tibble v. Edison Int'l, 729 F.3d 1110, 1134-35 (9th Cir. 2013), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 135 S. Ct. 1823 (2015)).
223 Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 585 (7th Cir. 2009).
224 Renfro v. Unisys Corp., 671 F.3d 314, 320 (3d Cir. 2011).
22s See generally Mercer Bullard, The Social Cost of Choice, Free Market Ideology
and the Empirical Consequences of the 401(k) Plan Large Menu Defense, 20 CONN. INS.
L.J. 335 (2014).
226 Id. at 337.
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There is, however, little in the statute itself to support the
views expressed in Renfro or Hecker.
The statute is emphatically not focused on participant choice,
but on participant future retirement income security. 227 The two
goals
are
not
synonymous.
As
Bullard
points
out,
"[n]otwithstanding the courts' views on rational choice theory, 'a
fully informed and fully rational investor would prefer a smaller
menu."'

228

In addition, and given that "[e]mpirical research shows that
larger menus are inversely correlated with workers' wealth,"229 it
seems clear that ERISA's fiduciary duties should be interpreted in
a manner designed to maximize employee wealth and not
employee choice. The DOL has expressed strong reservations
about this judicially created doctrine that finds no support in the
statute. It has noted that under this doctrine, " . . . the court's
decision H provide[s] a defense for a fiduciary's imprudent
selection of investment options if the fiduciary simply selected a
large number of options." 230 This runs counter to the spirit of

ERISA.
Hecker seemed to suggest that ERISA's "broad range"
requirement, 231 designed to promote and require the opportunity

.

227 See
History
of
EBSA
and
ERISA,
US
DEPT
LABOR,
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/about-ebsa/about-us/history-of-ebsa-and-erisa [https:
//perma.cc/4T39-FJES] (last visited Feb. 12, 2021) ("The provisions of Title I of ERISA
.. were enacted to address public concern that funds of private pension plans were
being mismanaged and abused.").
228 Bullard, supra note 225, at 337.
229 Id.
230 Id. at 344-345. (citing Amended Brief of the Sec'y of Labor, Elaine Chao, as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants, Hecker v. Deere & Co., 2008 WL
5731147 (7th Cir. Apr. 4, 2008) (No. 08-1224).
231 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(3)(i) ("A plan offers a broad range of investment
alternatives only if the available investment alternatives are sufficient to provide the
participant or beneficiary with a reasonable opportunity to: (A) Materially affect the
potential return on amounts . . . and the degree of risk to which such amounts are
subject; (B) Choose from at least three investment alternatives: (1) Each of which is
diversified; (2) Each of which has materially different risk and return characteristics;
(3) Which in the aggregate enable . . . them to achieve a portfolio with aggregate risk
and return characteristics at any point within the range normally appropriate . . . (4)
Each of which when combined with investments in the other alternatives tends to
minimize through diversification the overall risk of a participant's or beneficiary's
portfolio; (C) Diversify the investment of that portion of his individual account with
respect to which he is permitted to exercise control ... ").
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for diversification, can be satisfied simply by providing large
menus from which participants may choose. 232 The large menu
defense is rooted in a mistaken view that the choices of a free
market are always superior to the exercise of fiduciary
responsibility to "nudge" people in the direction of more optimal
choices. 2 33 Of this Jacob Hale Russell says:
Grand libertarian rhetoric notwithstanding, there is
absolutely nothing obvious or inevitable about the merits of
autonomy in 401(k) allocation. In fact, our private retirement
savings scheme is already deeply paternalistic and coercivein the form of the tax advantage provided for definedcontribution savings. . . . Those who would say it serves a
primarily societal function-creating a retirement safety net
and preventing individuals from becoming wards of the
state-should not be so hesitant about stating the obvious: we
need to tell [investors] how to invest their money.234
The large menu fallacy is, in turn, buttressed by the notion
that choice is valuable for its own sake, even if it consistently
results in sub optimal choices by the very individuals the statute
is expressly designed to protect.2 35 While the finer points of the
economic theories underpinning these views are not disputed here,
their applicability to legislation crafted for the express purpose of
protecting workers is.
Observations of reality clearly show why plentiful investment
offerings should not be a substitute for fiduciary oversight. One
study found that overly expensive and often poorly performing
funds known as "dominated funds" are present in 52% of plans
and, within plans that contained at least one, they averaged 15%

232 See Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). ("It is untenable to
suggest that all of the more than 2500 publicly available investment options had
excessive expense ratios. The only possible conclusion is that to the extent participants
incurred excessive expenses, those losses were the result of participants exercising
control over their investments ... ").
233 Jacob Hale Russell, The Separation of Intelligence and Control: Retirement
Savings and the Limits of Soft Paternalism,6 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REv. 35, 48 (2015)
(Nudging "refers to policy strategies that recognize the degree to which framing,
defaults, and 'choice architecture' affect decision making because of cognitive biases
like anchoring, availability, or the herd mentality.").
234 Id. at 77.
235 See Ayres, supra note 216, at 1510.
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of funds offered. 236 Participants are not forced to choose these
funds, but because of naive diversification strategies "chosen" by
many investors, they will tend to allocate their portfolios into
these low-quality products. Put another way, including a bad fund
alongside good funds is not a benign or neutral act. Because many
uneducated investors will spread their allocations amongst all
available funds, the inclusion of a dominated fund leads to
predictably worse outcomes for investors. 237
In the 2013 case Tibble v. Edison,238 the Ninth Circuit
promoted what seems a clearly superior view of the large menu
defense: "As compared to the beneficiary, the fiduciary is better
situated to prevent the losses that would stem from the inclusion
of unsound investment options. It can design a prudent menu of
options." 239 Combined with decades of data which demonstrate
that participant wealth is reduced by the presence of both too
many choices 24 0 and the presence of high fee options, 24 1
participants would benefit from the elimination of the large menu
defense as an option for plan sponsors who have been either too
lazy or too conflicted to exercise their fiduciary responsibilities in
the manner the statute contemplates.

D.

The Gartenberg Precedent

Quinn Curtis and John Morley described mutual funds and
their fees as "the elephants in the room of American finance." 242
With almost a quarter of all household wealth invested in mutual
funds, they have steadily grown in influence to become a massive
player in American retirement saving. 243 To combat the
proliferation of excessive fees in the mutual fund market brought
on by the lack of daylight between the funds and their advisors,

236

Id. at 1506.

See id. at 1511 (arguing that large menus do not evidence prudence, saying
"[h]igh fees-and particularly the inclusion of dominated funds-are strong evidence
that a fiduciary has not prudently constructed the menu").
238 Tibble v. Edison Int'l, 729 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2013), vacated and remanded on
other grounds, 575 U.S. 523 (2015).
239 Id. at 1125.
240 See Ayres, supra note 216, at 1505-06.
241 See id.
242 Curtis & Morley, supra note 219, at 3.
243 Morrissey, supra note 220, at 4.
237
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Congress passed legislation in the 1970s attempting to provide a
civil cause of action for excessive fees. 2 4 4 What teeth this
legislation had were removed by the Second Circuit's decision in
Gartenberg u. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc.. 245 What is
left is a precedent holding that, in order for a plaintiff to prevail in
an excessive fee suit, they must convince the court that the
"[a]dviser-manager . .
charge[d] a fee . . . so disproportionately
large that [it bears] no reasonable relationship to the services
rendered and could not have been the product of arm's-length
bargaining." 2 4 6 Needless to say, that bar is nigh impossible to
clear. Professor Quinn Curtis of the University of Virginia School
of Law asserts that "section 36(b) has never resulted in a verdict
for plaintiffs." 24 7 It seems unlikely that this is because the mutual
fund industry began acting with benevolence.
With Gartenberg blocking any chance of successfully
litigating an excessive fee case against the funds or advisors under
36(b) and with the balancing scales of the free market covered in
greasy thumb prints, the only defense retirement investors have
against excessively high fees is the prudent investment selection
and aggregated negotiating power of the institutions sponsoring
their plans.

E. Are High Fee Options Per Se ERISA violations?
A careful review of the university fee litigation cases raises
the direct question: why are high fee options permitted in 403(b)
plans when almost invariably there are comparable low fee
options for plan participants? The literature clearly establishes
that low fee indexed investments do no worse over time than
comparable high fee actively managed options. 2 4 8 In addition, high
fee options, at least in some cases, significantly erode the ability of
244 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-35(b) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 116-259) (the section of
the Investment Company Act of 1970 which purports to prohibit mutual funds from
charging excessive fees).
246 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982).

246

Id. at 928.

247

Quinn Curtis, The Past and Present of Mutual Fund Fee Litigation Under

Section 36(b), in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE REGULATION OF MUTUAL FUNDS 164,

164 (William A. Birdthistle & John Morley eds., 2018).
248 Ayres, supra note 216, at 467-68 (citing to numerous studies which show actively
managed funds with higher fees consistently fail to outperform the market over time).
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participants to save for retirement and enjoy the tax benefits
Congress intends. 249 This problem is especially prevalent in the
largest plans. One study found (albeit in the 401(k) context) that
while on average plans were paying .63% in excess fees, the top
5% of plans paid 2.05% extra. 250
The persistence of high fee choices seems clearly linked to a
failure of oversight and/or the cozy relationships, as seen in the
MIT
case,
between
plan
sponsors
and
their
record
keeper/investment managers. 2 51 Both of these scenarios are
problematic, although the MIT story is most troubling as it
reveals, like the ongoing "Varsity Blues" prosecutions, 2 52 an ugly
and yet seemingly inescapable feature of modern day higher ed:
the need to cultivate relationships with wealthy and powerful
donors. These relationships require that something of benefit
flows to each party. In the case of MIT, it appears the university
enjoyed years of donations and largesse from the Johnson family;
Fidelity, the family's signature business venture, enjoyed nearexclusive access to MIT plan participants' investment dollars.
Naturally, the only losers in this arrangement were the faculty,
staff, and administrators who overpaid.
The unreasonably high fee claim is essentially the only one to
survive across all of the higher ed cases we have reviewed. The
courts have consistently rejected the duty of loyalty claims 253 and
repeatedly expressed doubts about the legal theories presented

249 See id. at 454 ("Paying excessive fees can be an investment mistake because
these fees eat away at the net return. For example, paying an excess fee of 2% over
time can halve your retirement savings.").
250

Id.

See generally Complaint-Class Action, supra note 4.
See, e.g., Jennifer Medina, Katie Benner & Kate Taylor, Actresses, Business
Leaders and Other Wealthy Parents Charged in U.S. College Entry Fraud, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/12/us/college-admissions-cheatingscandal.html [https://perma.cc/FK7H-VTVJ] (The so called "Varsity Blues" scandal, so
named for the F.B.I. code name for its investigation, involved wealthy parents using
fraud and bribery to get their children admitted to top undergraduate programs
through falsifying test scores and athletic achievements. At least 50 people have been
charged in the scandal, and at least 12 of them with racketeering. Parents paid
between $15,000 and $6.5 million to secure admission for their children.).
253 See, e.g., Tracey v. Mass. Inst. Tech., No. 16-cv-11620-NMG, 2017 WL 4478239,
at *2 (D. Mass. Oct. 04, 2017) ("... conduct regarding the excessive management fees
did not plausibly state a claim of violation of the duty of loyalty because plaintiffs'
theory was speculative.").
251

252
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with respect to the prohibited transaction claims. 2 54 This suggests
that, at least for now, fees are the most likely arena for reform.
The simplest mechanism for ensuring that participants maximize
the return on their investment is to prohibit outright the inclusion
of high fee options in 403(b) plans, at least where comparable lowcost options are available.
Objections to regulation in this area from the financial
services industry are to be expected. 255 In spite of the testimony
provided
at the
Fitzgerald
hearings 256
and numerous
commentators who have called for fee reform over many years, 257
SIFMA, the financial services sector's lobbying arm, spends vast
amounts of money to influence policy, 258 and it appears that
litigation and not legislation offers the best prospect for
meaningful reform. Eight cases have settled so far for a total of
over $85 million. 259 These settlements have surely changed the
environment against which future high fee claims will be made.
Going forward it will be harder for similarly situated defendants
to assert that their peer institutions' failure to weed out
imprudent investment options should protect them. 260 Critically,
254 See, e.g., id. at *3 ("Plaintiffs do not plausibly allege that the 'kickback scheme'
was more than a coincidence or innocuous activity. To the extent that the claims of
breach of the duty of loyalty in Counts I and II are implausible, so too is the subjective
intent element of the prohibited transaction claim.").
255 See Bentsen, supra note 206.
256 See generally FitzgeraldHearings, supra note 66.
257 See supra notes 215-219 and accompanying text.
258 See Securities Industry & FinancialMkt Assn, OPENSECRETS, http://www.opense
crets.org/orgs//summary?id=D000000229 [https://perma.cc/DEU7-FAFV] (last visited
Feb. 20, 2021) (showing that SIFMA, spent over $6.6 million on lobbying efforts in
2019); see also Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Lobby's Co-CEO Quit After Probe, WASH. POST
(May 17, 2007), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/16/AR
2007051602427_2.html
[https://perma.cc/Q837-MEYP]
(discussing
campaign
contributions, stating "[t]he financial-services industry is the biggest corporate player
in national politics. Only organized labor donates more money to candidates for federal
offices.").
259 See supra note 36 (Settlements include $18.1 million at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, $14.5 million at Vanderbilt University, $14 million at Johns
Hopkins University, $3.5 million at Brown University, $6.5 million at the University of
Chicago, $10.65 million at Duke University, $17 million at Emory (pending), and an
undisclosed amount at Princeton.).
260 Memorandum
of Law in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the
Complaint for Failure to State a Claim and/or Motion for Summary Judgment at 19,
Nicolas v. Trs. of Princeton Univ, No. 3:17-cv-03695, 2017 WL 44455897 (D.N.J. Sept.
25, 2017) ("Indeed, the fact that so many other university-sponsored 403(b) plans, with
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all settlements have required serious reforms in the way the plans
are managed. 261
Should MIT and other defendants land squarely in an all or
nearly all low fee set of investment options, other universities will
almost certainly need to follow suit. Over time, the remaining high
fee plan sponsors would surely struggle to explain and justify the
ongoing presence of options that are so costly to participants.
A presumption that high fee vehicles are generally
inappropriate for 403(b) retirement plans would no doubt spread
quickly to the larger (and more lucrative) 401(k) market. 262 This
would be an unqualified win for participants in both the for-profit
and not-for-profit sectors of the economy. Financial services
providers would, in response, have to search for profits elsewhere
or figure out how to provide consistently higher returns to justify
the fees associated with their managed funds.
CONCLUSION

The recent spate of university fee litigation cases has
uncovered and targeted a feature common to many 403(b) plans
sponsored by institutions of higher education: a failure to
similar annuity products, have been accused of paying excessive recordkeeping fees,
measured against the same $35 dollar benchmark, suggests that this is not the norm
for these unique plans with their unique annuity products.").
261 See, e.g.,
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Unopposed Motion for
Preliminary Approval of Class Settlement, at 3-4, Tracey v. Mass. Inst. Tech., No. 16cv-11620-NMG (D. Mass. Oct. 28, 2019), ECF No. 291 (In addition to the $18.1 million,
MIT agreed to address the conditions that had caused participant losses including
annual training of fiduciaries in their duties, regularly putting recordkeeping services
out to competitive bid, and evaluating all plan offerings for prudence).
262 See Christine Benz, 100 Must-Know Statistics About 401(k) Plans, MORNINGSTAR
(Sept. 4, 2020), www.morningstar.com/articles/1000743/100-must-know-statistics-about
-401k-plans [https://perma.cc/SX4S-N4AT]. Benz notes that in 2019, $6.4 trillion in
assets were held in 401(k) plans as compared to $2.7 trillion in other DC plans
including 403(b) plans. Id. She also notes that the average cost for a 401(k) participant
is 0.58%. Id. And although the focus here is on the 403(b) market and claims of high
fees, the 401(k) market has not been spared similar scrutiny. On the contrary, three
dozen lawsuits against 401(k) providers have been filed-most since the onset of the
COVID-19 pandemic-and, like the university fee litigation detailed here, the suits
have focused on allegations of unreasonably high fees and breaches of plan duties owed
to participants under ERISA. Ilana Polyak, 401(k) Lawsuits on the Rise as Participants
Target Fees, Conflicts of Interest and Data Privacy, BENEFITSPRO (Jan. 21, 2021, 8:31
AM), https://www.benefitspro.com/2021/01/21/401k-lawsuits-on-the-rise-as-participants
-target-fees-conflicts-of-interest-and-data-privacy/ [https://perma.cc/TV6B-LNK3].
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aggressively police choices available to participants for excessive
fees, duplication and the presence of actively managed funds of
dubious value. ERISA litigation to address these concerns has
produced mixed results. Duty of prudence claims have tended to
generate the most support from a variety of federal courts when
confronted by a pattern of indifferent and/or self-interested
decision making by plan sponsors. All too often, universities
appear to have selected multiple record keepers without regard to
cost; sometimes these selections appear to be based on the
enhancement of donor relationships which raises serious doubts
about the prudence and loyalty expected by ERISA fiduciaries. We
anticipate that many more of these cases will settle and that some
of the excess expenses will be returned to participants. If
policymakers adopted rules which rejected the approach in
Gartenberg and the large menu defense, future participants could
save in 403(b) vehicles without waiting for class action law firms
to step in and force broad changes in the way these plans are
managed.
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